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THE SILENCED MAJORITY: MARTIN 
v. WILKS AND THE LEGISLATIVE 
RESPONSE 
Susan S. Grover• 
An American worker finds himself disadvantaged by an em-
ployer's affirmative action program. The worker heads for the court-
house, reverse discrimination complaint in hand. Will he be allowed 
to sue? Prior to the Supreme Court's 1989 Martin v. Wilks decision, 
the answer to that question tended to be "no. " Wilks changed the 
answer to an emphatic 'yes." With the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the 
answer has become "probably not. " This article discusses the bar 
against such challenges as developed through case law and recent con-
gressional action. It addresses the implications that the new statutory 
bar will have for the structure of discrimination suits. The article also 
advocates measures that will both enhance the prospects for consent 
decree finality and preserve the legal rights of the American working 
majority. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that a group of minority employees file suit alleging that 
their employer has discriminated against them because of their race. The 
employees and their employer agree to settle the case, with the employer 
undertaking affirmative action measures designed to enhance employ-
ment opportunities for minorities, As usually happens, the parties ask 
the court to enter the agreement as a consent decree. 1 The employer 
fulfills its affirmative action promises, and that ends the matter-until a 
• Assistant Professor of Law, College of William & Mary. A.B. 1973, Hollins College; J.D. 
1983, Georgetown University. The College of William and Mary provided summer research grant 
suppon for this project. 
l. A consent decree is a hybrid combining qualities ofboth contracts and judgments. United 
States v. ITI Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 235-37 (1975). The substance of the decree is 
arrived at contractually, by mutual agreement of the parties seeking to settle the case. /d. at 234-35. 
As one author defined it, "[a] consent decree is a settlement agreement among the parties to a law-
suit, signed by the court and entered as a judgment in the case." Maimon Schwarzschild, Public 
Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Re-
form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 894. Violation of the decree, like violation of a judgment, is punishable 
by contempt. /IT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. at 226; Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 
818 F.2d 1089, 1097-98 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 439-40 (5th 
Cir. 1981 ). Consent decrees are very popular vehicles for the resolution of Title VII and other public 
law cases. Schwarzschild, supra, at 899. Such decrees serve the shared intereSt of the court and the 
parties in avoiding the expense and burdens of trial and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining a settle-
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group of white employees2 learns that minority employees are securing 
employment opportunities that traditionally would have been theirs. 
When the white employees make this discovery, they file suit against the 
employer, alleging that the employer is discriminating against them on 
the basis of their race by preferring minority employees. 3 
In recent years, there has been great controversy over whether white 
employees should be permitted to bring reverse discrimination suits chal-
lenging affirmative action taken pursuant to consent decrees. The federal 
courts initially barred such challenges as "impermissible collateral at-
tacks. " 4 That doctrine precluded challenges to consent decrees unless 
intervenors raised the challenges in the decree suit itself. The Supreme 
Court rejected the collateral attack doctrine in 1989 in Martin v. Wilks, 5 
according majority employees carte blanche to challenge affirmative ac-
tion consent decrees. Congress's 1990 attempt6 to overrule Wilks legisla-
tively met with a presidential veto. 7 In 1991, however, Congress 
successfully enacted legislation that partially overruled Wilks . 8 As the 
ment enforceable by the court's contempt power. See Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights 
of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321, 326-27 (1988). 
The Supreme Court has stated that "federal courts should act only after hearing 'a clash of 
adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and 
demanding interests.'" Schwarzschild, supra, at 903 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 {1967) 
(citing United States v. Freuhauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961))). Nevertheless, the federal courts today 
are deemed empowered to enter consent decrees arising precisely from the absence of controversy. 
ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. at 243; United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1931). 
2. This article speaks of "white" or "majority" employees to refer to any group that might file 
a challenge to actions taken pursuant to a consent decree. Such employees could, in fact, conceiva-
bly be members of a minority group not benefited by the decree. 
3. The Supreme Court has recognized that such claims of "reverse discrimination" state 
causes of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail 
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
4. The doctrine arguably is misnamed because a "collateral" attack often is thought of as an 
attack on a judgment by a party to the judgment. See United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 
1256, 1262 (7th Cir. 1989). The majority challengers contemplated here are, by definition, not par-
ties. Nevertheless, the term "collateral" does serve to emphasize the crucial distinction between 
separate suits brought to challenge a decree "collaterally" and direct challenges mounted by major-
ity employers who have intervened in the decree suit itself. 
5. 490 u.s. 755 (1989). 
6. S. 2104, lOist Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1989); H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1989) 
[hereinafter collectively cited as Civil Rights Act of 1990]. 
7. The number of votes garnered to override that veto fell just short of the required two-thirds 
majority. 136 CONG. REC. S. 16589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990). 
8. Section 108 of the 1991 Act provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in paragraph (2), an 
employment practice that implements and is within the scope of a litigated or consent judgment 
or order that resolves a claim of employment discrimination under the Constitution or Federal 
civil rights laws may not be challenged under the circumstances described in subparagraph (B). 
(B) A practice described in subparagraph (A) may not be challenged in a claim under the 
Constitution or Federal civil rights laws-
(i) by a person who, prior to the entry of the judgment or order described in subpara-
graph (A), had-
(1) actual notice of the proposed judgment or order sufficient to apprise such person 
that such judgment or order might adversely affect the interests and legal rights of such 
person and that an opportunity was available to present objections to such judgment or 
order by a future date certain; and 
(II) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judgment or order; or 
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law now stands, then, the majority employees in our hypothetical proba-
bly are barred from bringing a subsequent reverse discrimination suit 
when they feel the effects of the consent decree that resolved the earlier 
case. 9 Whether they should be barred from bringing such a suit is a com-
plex question. 
The tension between the need to allow collateral challenges and the 
need to immunize decrees from such challenges arises from the conflict 
between the goal of assuring that majority employees receive their day in 
court and the goal of assuring the finality of settlements that have been 
long and costly in the making. The bar, whether common law or statu-
tory, diminishes the whites' day in court. It effectively relegates them to 
intervention in the original minority suit against the employer or forces 
them to rely on representation provided by a similarly situated person 
who did, in fact, present objections in the decree suit. This gives the 
white would-be plaintiffs legitimate cause for concern. Even if they have 
had an opportunity to intervene in the original suit, they are losing the 
right to pursue independently any valid claims they may have. On the 
other hand, proponents of the bar argue that both the judiciary and em-
ployment discrimination litigants would face very practical difficulties if 
majority employees could challenge consent decrees collaterally. 
Most importantly, the prospect of collateral attacks significantly di-
minishes the incentive to settle. This is especially true for employers who 
expend resources to implement the required affirmative action, only to be 
forced then to litigate the decree's legality and perhaps dismantle any 
affirmative action undertaken. To the extent that the bar decreases set-
tlement potential, it also burdens the courts, because settlements are by 
far the most common and efficient way to terminate employment dis-
crimination suits. Diminishing settlement prospects also reduces the 
(ii) by a person whose interests were adequately represented by another person who had 
previously challenged the judgment or order on the same legal grounds and with a similar 
factual situation, unless there has been an intervening change in law or fact. 
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to-
(A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of the Fedeni.l Rules of Civil Proce-
dure or apply to the rights of parties who have successfully intervened pursuant to such rule in 
the proceeding in which the parties intervened; 
(B) apply to the rights of parties to the action in which a litigated or consent judgment or 
order was entered, or of members of a class represented or sought to be represented in such 
action, or of members of a group on whose behalf relief was sought in such action by the 
Federal Government; 
(C) prevent challenges to a litigated or consent judgment or order on the ground that such 
judgment or order was obtained through collusion or fraud, or is transparently invalid or was 
entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction; or 
(D) authorize or permit the denial to any person of the due process of law required by the 
Constitution. 
(3) Any action not precluded under this subsection that challenges an employment consent 
judgment or order described in paragraph (1) shall be brought in the court, and if possible 
before the judge, that entered such judgment or order. Nothing in this subsection shall preclude 
a transfer of such action pursuant to section 1404 of title 28, United States Code. 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, sec. 108, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076-77 (Nov. 21, 1991) (to 
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). 
9. /d. The Act's effective date is November 21, 1991. /d. sec. 402, 105 Stat. at 1099. 
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sum total of affirmative action ultimately accomplished as a result of em-
ployment discrimination litigation because courts scrutinize affirmative 
action in a consent decree less closely than affirmative action contained 
in a court order following full adjudication. 
Issues of how and when collateral attacks on consent decrees should 
be barred raise due process concerns, involve problems of judicial econ-
omy for already overburdened courts, and implicate the commitment to 
reducing employment discrimination through affirmative action. There-
fore, resolving the problems that the collateral attack bar presents is im-
portant. This article undertakes that resolution. 
Properly applied, the legislative bar can protect majority employees 
and, simultaneously, assure the finality of consent decrees. Although al-
ternatives considered in the legislative process might have caused due 
process concerns, the bar finally enacted is free of constitutional infirmi-
ties. 10 In particular, the legislative bar of suits by majority employees 
who have had notice and an opportunity to be heard and of people whose 
interests have been adequately represented adequately protects the inter-
ests of the bound absentees. This article therefore focuses more on 
proper implementation of the bar than on the propriety of the bar itself. 
This article considers a major change in the legislation effectuated 
between the time the legislation was vetoed in 1990 and the time it was 
enacted in 1991. This change, deletion of a category of individuals to 
whom constitutionally adequate efforts at notice have been made, will 
have both positive and negative implications for the Act's effectiveness. 
On the positive side, the deletion virtually eliminates the potential that 
accomplishment of the Act's goals will be thwarted by lawsuits challeng-
ing the Act's constitutionality. The deletion effectively rids the Act of 
the only constitutionally troubling provision. On the negative side, the 
deletion leaves the door open to a vast number of challenges that would 
have been impermissible under the vetoed 1990 version. This article rec-
ommends mechanisms that, by partially closing the gap, will permit an 
expansive construction of the remaining categories of preclusion to com-
pensate for the deletion. 
This article also considers the structure of litigation in which the bar 
may operate. Specifically, the article proposes three ways in which 
courts should adjust decision making in light of the bar adopted. It ar-
gues that judges should rarely use Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure-requiring parties to join additional "necessary parties"-in 
original suits. Courts should, by contrast, apply Rule 24 liberally to per-
mit majority employee intervention in such cases. Courts also should 
scrutinize proposed consent decrees more closely than in the past and, in 
10. A bar, proposed but ultimately rejected, relied on adequacy of efforts to notify majority 
employees, even though those bound would receive no actual notice. This bar might have been 
sufficiently protective if courts had implemented proper precautionary measures. 
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the course of that scrutiny, should apply standards that have been estab-
lished inr 'cases of posten try review. 
II. JUDICIAL GROUNDWORK FOR CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENT OF 
THE COLLATERAL A TrACK BAR 
Two judicial trends~precipitated Congress's enactment of the 1991 
Civil Rights Act's section 108, which bars collateral challenges to con-
sent decrees. One trend was the development among lower federal courts 
of a common law doctrine barring such challenges. The other was a 
countervailing trend in the Supreme Court to shift protections from mi-
nority victims of discrimination to majority employees who might be in-
jured by consent decrees to which the majority employees were not party. 
A. The Judicially-Created Impermissible Collateral Attack Doctrine 
At its inception, the bar against attacks on consent decrees was a 
creature of the common law. By 1988, most federal circuits had rejected 
attempts by majority employees to use "reverse discrimination" suits to 
attack consent decrees settling earlier employment discrimination suits. 11 
The courts rejecting these suits characterized the suits as "impermissible 
collateraJ attacks." 12 Instead of allowing such independent law suits, 
courts limited the majority employees to pressing their challenges as in-
tervenors in the original suit that produced the consent decree. 13 
Courts differed on a number of the doctrine's elements. Some courts 
imposed an absolute bar on all lawsuits that challenged action taken pur-
11. See Ashley v. City ofJackson, 464 U.S. 900, 902 (1983)(Rehnquist, J., joined by Brennan, 
J ., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.ld 1144, 1146 (ld Cir. 1986}, a.ff'd by 
an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 301 (1988}; Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 558 (6th 
Cir. 1982}, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 
561 (1984); Mark E. Recktenwald, Comment, Collateral Attacks on Employment Discrimination 
Consent Decrees, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 172 (1986). See generally Kramer, supra note 1. Some 
courts and cOmmentators questioned whether the doctrine should apply to judgments as well as to 
consent decrees. One view was that judgments could be applied more fairly to bind nonparties 
because judgments result from adjudication, whereas consent decrees merely result from private 
contractual agreements. Ashley, 464 U.S. at 902. Another view was that the congressional prefer-
ence for Title VII settlements spawned the impermissible collateral attack doctrine, see Thaggard v. 
City of Jackson, 687 F.ld 66, 69 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 900 (1983), so that it logically 
should not extend to judgments. It also has been argued that, if the preference for settlement was the 
only ground for the doctrine, then the doctrine was an unfounded and improper piece of judicial 
legislation. Kramer, supra note 1, at 335, 339. 
12. Marino, 806 F.ld 1144; Devereaux v. Geary, 765 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 
U.S. 1021 (1986); Thaggard, 687 F.2d at 69; Stotts, 619 F.2d 541; Dennison v. City of Los Angeles 
Dep't of Water & Power, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981); Society Hill Civic Ass'n v. Harris, 632 F.2d 
1045 (3d Cir. 1980}; Bums v. Board of School Comm'rs, 437 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1971). The Elev-
enth Circuit, however, persisted in allowing white employees to bring collateral attacks against af-
firmative action consent decrees when it had occasion to consider the issue in the case of In re 
Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation, 833 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1987), 
known in its Supreme Court posture as Martin v. Wilks . 
13. By limiting the majority employees, the courts superimposed on the majority employees' 
right to challenge the time limitations contained in Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
pertaining to intervention. Kramer, supra note l, at 332. 
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suant to a decree, 14 whereas others barred only challengers who had had 
an opportunity to intervene in the original suit. 15 Some courts barred 
only those seeking modification of the decree, whereas others forbade any 
collateral suit, whether seeking to affect the decree's terms or simply 
seeking damages for injuries resulting from implementation of the 
decree.16 
The common law bar did not wholly eliminate challenges to consent 
decrees, but simply restricted the form and timing of those challenges. It 
barred only challenges raised in suits collateral to the original minority 
law suit, leaving the majority employees free to intervene in the original 
suit and to raise their challenges there. 17 Thus, the bar did not necessar-
ily deprive majority employees of their day in court, but instead limited 
the timing and venue of their challenge. 
The courts adopted the collateral attack doctrine in order to further 
the goal of finality, 18 to avoid inconsistent judgments, 19 and to encourage 
consent decree resolutions to litigation. 20 The special need to bind non-
party majority employees by precluding their challenges to consent de-
crees grew out of the very nature of consent decrees and of the 
discrimination suits that they resolve. 21 Settlement of this type of case is 
very likely to give rise to third-party challenges; third-party challanges 
can, m tum, be particularly devastating for the parties in this type of 
case. 
14. Thaggard, 681 F.2d at 69. 
15. Observers and courts disagree on whether foregoing an opportunity to intervene in the 
original suit was a prerequisite to the doctrine's application. Compare Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 
755, 762-66 (1989) and Kramer, supra note 1, at 322 (suggesting opportunity to intervene is a pre-
requisite) with U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1990 58 (July 1990) (suggesting bar was absolute 
regardless of opportunity to intervene). Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Wilks, treated the doctrine as 
barring only those employees who had had an opportunity to intervene. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762-66; 
see also Marino, 806 F.2d at 1146; Dennison, 658 F.2d at 696; Prate v. Freedman, 430 F. Supp. 1373, 
1375 (W.D.N .Y.), a.ff'd sub nom. Zavaglia v. Freedman, 573 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1977). Commenta-
tors have questioned the constitutionality of binding those who have not had such an opportunity. 
See, e.g., Recktenwald, supra note 11, at 163-64. 
16. See Dennison, 658 F.2d at 694-95; Kramer, supra note 1, at 333. 
17. For the sake of consistency of judgments, it is crucial that challenges do take place in the 
decree suit, rather than in an independent suit. The court in the decree suit can modify the decree to 
obviate any legal infirmity the majority employees have disclosed, whereas a court managing a sepa-
rate lawsuit could do little more than order the employer to violate the decree or pay damages to the 
majority employees-not always an adequate remedy. See United States v. City of Chicago, 870 
F .2d 1256, 1262 (7th Cir. 1989). 
18. Marino, 806 F.2d at 1146; Thaggard, 687 F.2d at 69. The doctrine did not infringe upon 
the right of parties and absentees to seek modification of consent decrees pursuant to changed condi-
tions. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1932). 
19. Marino, 806 F .2d at 1146. 
20. In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1498 (11th 
Cir. 1987); Marino , 806 F .2d at 1146; Thaggard, 681 F .2d at 69. Courts have recognized a strong 
preference for voluntary settlement of Title VII cases. See Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U .S. 501, 
515 (1986); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); Thaggard , 681 F.2d at 69; see 
also Schwarzschild, supra note 1, at 894-95; Recktenwald, supra note II, at 148-51. 
21. See Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting 
Third Parties, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103, 105-10. 
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Any time affirmative action comes into play, there is a chance that 
majority employees will be disadvantaged: affirmative action plans often 
take away from the majority whatever advantages the plans are reserving 
for the minority.22 Reverse discrimination lawsuits, therefore, are always 
a possibility.23 At the same time, much employment discrimination liti-
gation entails broad institutional challenges, resulting in affirmative ac-
tion plans that are, in tum, also broad and institutionwide. 
Implementation of such plans involves tremendous institutional adjust-
ment and expense. 24 Thus, when the majority employees bring a suit to 
challenge a plan so costly to put into place, courts and employers-to say 
nothing of the benefited minorities-may have good reason to balk at the 
idea of having to dismantle their affirmative action handiwork. 
These considerations explain why a majority of circuit courts ap-
proved the impermissible collateral attack doctrine. The same considera-
tions did not persuade the Supreme Court, however, which invalidated 
the doctrine in 1989 in Martin v. Wilks. In that case, the Court held that 
majority employees indeed may bring a subsequent collateral suit to chal-
lenge an affirmative action consent decree. 25 
B. Martin v. Wilks 
In Martin v. Wilks, minority employees of the city of Birmingham, 
Alabama, brought suit against Birmingham, alleging Title VII violations 
with respect to that city's hiring and promotion practices.26 To resolve 
this litigation, the parties proposed two consent decrees, each including 
affirmative action goals for the hiring and promotion of black firefighters. 
The district court scheduled fairness hearings27 and gave public notice 
regarding the consent decrees. At the fairness hearings, the Birmingham 
Firefighters Association (BFA), a union that was not a party to the suit, 
filed objections to the decrees. After the conclusion of the hearings, but 
before approval of the decrees, the BFA and two individual firefighters 
moved to intervene, contending that the decrees would affect their rights 
adversely. The district court rejected these motions as untimely28 and 
gave final approval of the decrees. Additional firefighters subsequently 
sued for preliminary injunctive relief to forestall implementation of the 
22. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398-99 (1982). 
23. It is, by now, well established that Title VII permits race discrimination suits by whites. 
See McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 286-87 (1976). 
24. See, e.g., Cindy Vreeland, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and Federal Rule 
24(a), 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 280 (1990) (citing William Burnham, Aspirational and Existential 
Interests of Social Reform Organizations: A New Role for the Ideological Plaintiff, 20 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 153, 153 (1985)). 
25. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762-63 (1989). 
26. The Jefferson County Personnel Board was joined as a defendant. /d. at 758. The joint 
defendants are hereinafter referred to as "the City." 
27. See infra notes 214-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of the fairness 
hearing in courts' consideration of consent decrees. 
28. See discussion infra notes 123-65 and accompanying text (intervention timeliness 
requirements). 
50 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1992 
consent decrees, but the district court denied the relief requested. 29 
After the Eleventh Circuit affirmed these rulings, several white em-
ployees, including Robert Wilks, brought a separate reverse discrimina-
tion suit against the city, claiming that the consent decrees discriminated 
against them in violation of federal law.30 The district court rejected 
these arguments, applying what was in essence the impermissible collat-
eral attack doctrine. Although the city admitted making race-conscious 
decisions, the district court ruled that the consent decrees were an abso-
lute defense to the white employees' challenges as long as the consent 
decrees truly required the city's actions. 31 The trial court found that the 
decrees indeed did require the city's actions and dismissed the majority 
employees' suit. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the consent 
decrees did not preclude Wilks's claim because he was neither a party to 
the suit in which the decrees were entered nor in privity with a party to 
that suit. Rejecting the impermissible collateral attack doctrine, the 
court of appeals concluded that the public policy encouraging voluntary 
affirmative action programs had to "yield to the policy against requiring 
third parties to submit to bargains in which their interests were either 
ignored or sacrificed."32 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit. Like the Elev-
enth Circuit, the Supreme Court rejected the collateral attack doctrine, 
finding that it impermissibly bound non parties to the suit. 33 Writing for 
the Court, 34 Chief Justice Rehnquist specifically rejected what he called 
the "linchpin" of the doctrine: the idea that, by failing to intervene in the 
first suit, the white employees had rendered themselves bound by the 
consent decree. 35 Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, in cases in 
which the minority employees hope to bind absentees, such as the whites 
there in question, the absentees do not have the burden of seeking inter-
vention in the original suit. 36 Rather, those already parties to the suit 
29. Both the two individual firefighters who protested at the fairness hearing and these plain-
tiffs in the second suit were members of the Birmingham Firefighters Association. 
30. In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492 (lith Cir. 
1987), aff'd sub nom. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). 
31. /d. at 1496-97. The primary issue in an intentional race discrimination suit is whether the 
employment decision at issue was based on race, rather than on some other factor. See Goodman v. 
Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 664-65 ( 1987). This issue clearly had to be resolved in favor of the 
majority employees in Wilks because it was entirely due to the employees' races that some were 
advantaged and some disadvantaged by the affirmative action plan. The court treated the affirmative 
action plan as an affirmative defense, available to a defendant who admittedly had discriminated. 
The Court then held a trial to resolve the issue of whether the decrees required the City's actions. 
32. Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 1498. 
33. This res judicata aspect of the court's opinion actually forms only a very small part of the 
court's rationale. Assessing to what extent res judicata principles are intended to form a major 
premise of the opinion is difficult. In this brief part of his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist did echo 
the position he had taken in Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900 (1983), in which he argued that 
the collateral attack doctrine violated due process. See id. at 901-02. 
34. Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion. 
35. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765 (1989). 
36. Part of Chief Justice Rehnquist's rationale on this point was that those present in the suit 
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must invoke Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to obtain 
joinder of the absentees as necessary parties. 37 
There is a certain irony to the Wilks rationale. In the process of 
striking down the collateral attack bar, the opinion suggests that joinder 
under Rule 19 will accomplish the ends previously achieved by the im-
permissible collateral attack doctrine's mandatory intervention system. 
Yet, Rule 19 does not achieve that doctrine's objectives of finality and 
completeness of judgments in cases such as Wilks, where the minorities' 
suit ends in a consent decree. On the contrary, even if the majority em-
ployees in Wilks had been joined under Rule 19, as the Chief Justice's 
opinion advocates, they would not have been bound by any resultant 
consent decree38 because of the Supreme Court's 1986 holding in Local 
93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland (hereinaf-
ter Firefighters). 39 
C Firefighters v. City of Cleveland 
The import of Wilks can be understood only in the light of Firefight-
ers. Firefighters places Wilks in important historical context, for 
Firefighters thematically foreshadows the Wilks decision. Firefighters, in 
effect, demonstrates that Wilks forms part of a trend in Supreme Court. 
doctrine and is not an isolated event. 
In Firefighters, majority employees successfully intervened in a suit 
are in a better position to predict likely consequences of the suit, and thus to know whose interests 
are most likely to be affected. /d. It has been argued in response to this position that, if indeed the 
parties are in a position to know better than the absentees whose interests will be affected, then the 
parties may supply the benefit of that knowledge by being required to provide notice to the absentees, 
rather than by having to join them. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 61. 
37. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 765. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: "Joinder as a party, rather than 
knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are 
subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree." /d. The Court found 
the mandatory intervention aspect of the impermissible collateral attack doctrine to be inconsistent 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure scheme, which permits, but does not require, intervention. 
/d. at 765-66. As is discussed infra at note 166, Rule 19 envisions two categories of absentees who 
must be joined: "necesSa.ry" and "indispensable" parties. One does not always know (at what is 
usually thought of as the joinder stage of litigation) whether a case will be resolved by consent decree 
or by trial. Because Rule 19 is available as a joinder mechanism up until, and even during, trial, 
thinking about cases as "consent decree cases" for purposes of this joinder mechanism is possible. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee's notes, 1966 amends. 
38. Of course, the majority employees would not be bound if joined as intervenors either. The 
difference between intervention and Rule 19 in this context lies in what results if there is a failure to 
join the majority employees under the two regimes. Under the impermissible collateral attack doc-
trine, if the majority employees fail to intervene, they are bound. Under the Rule 19 joinder rule, the 
parties' failure to join the majority employees renders those employees not bound by the consent 
decree. Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision does not propose to decide what result application of the 
Rule 19 criteria should yield. Rather, he decides only that the parties to the case bear the burden of 
seeking the absentees' joinder. But see George M. Strickler, Martin v. Wilks, 64 TuL. L. REv. 1557, 
1605 (1990). The decree would bind these joined majority employees only if they decided they 
wanted to be bound by the decree and actually joined in requesting the decree. There is often no 
reason to believe that majority employees with nothing to gain would gratuitously relinquish their 
employment rights by joining in a consent decree. 
39. 478 u.s. 501 (1986). 
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brought by minority employees charging Title VII violations.40 When 
the minority employees and their employer repeatedly sought to resolve 
their dispute with a consent decree, the intervenors adamantly objected 
to the court's entry of the decree. 41 The trial court became extensively 
involved in the settlement process. The court held two fairness hearings, 
proposed its own alternative plans, and sponsored extensive negotiations 
by the parties under the supervision of a federal magistrate.42 The inter-
venors persisted in their objections, however, and, when the court en-
tered the decree over those objections, appealed entry of the decree. 43 
The intervenors based their appeal in large part on the argument 
that the trial court was without power to enter the decree over the inter-
venors' objections.44 On this issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
court's holding: the intervenors were powerless to prevent the district 
court from entering an affirmative action consent decree agreed to by the 
other two parties in the case.45 By the same token, however, the Court 
stated that the consent decree entered by the district court could not 
dispose of the nonconsenting intervenors' claims that the decree was un-
lawful.46 The majority employees could not be bound by the decree, and 
their claims remained to be litigated fully. Firefighters thus established a 
theme and premise upon which the Court acted again in Wilks two years 
later: the interests of finality and certainty in the consent decree context 
40. /d. 
41. /d. at 509. 
42. /d. at 508-11. 
43. The majority employees' primary objection centered on the fact that the court's approval of 
that agreement-in the form of a decree-would have had the effect of ordering relief to nonvictims 
of discrimination. The majority employees argued that award of relief to non victims would violate 
§ 706(g) of Title VII. /d. at 513-14. Section 706(g) forbids courts from ordering reinstatement and 
other relief if the adverse employment action is due to something other than discrimination. On the 
same day the Court decided Firefighters, but in a different case, the Supreme Court rejected the 
premise that courts may never award Title VII relief that benefits individuals who were not actual 
victims of discrimination. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 
(1986). The Court did not need to decide whether Firefighters was an appropriate case for the award 
of such relief, however, because it found that a consent decree does not constitute an "order" for 
purposes of§ 706(g). Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 521 . In order to conclude that a consent decree is not 
a § 706(g) order, the Court had to consider how consent decrees differ from adjudicated orders in the 
Title VII context. Most importantly, the Court found that consent decrees are voluntary and 
§ 706(g) orders are coercive. /d. at 519-23. The Court found that whatever limits§ 706(g) imposes 
on affirmative relief are entirely inapplicable to consent decrees. The decision in Firefighters signifies 
that a federal court may enter an affirmative action consent decree regardless of the fact that the 
same court would be powerless under Title VII to order the particular affirmative action upon adju-
dication of the Title VII claim. 
44. /d. at 528. 
45. Id. at 529 (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392, 400 (1982); Kirk-
land v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 711 F.2d 1117, 1126 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1005 (1984)). The intervenors, of course, might have persuaded the Court that it should 
not enter the decree. They, in fact, attempted to do so at the fairness hearing, but failed. Once they 
had failed in their efforts to persuade the Court, the intervenors could not then assert a veto power 
over the entry of the decree despite that failure. 
46. /d. The Court expressed the view, however, that it may have been too late, by the time the 
case reached the Supreme Court, for the whites to raise any substantive challenges to the decree. 
This view must have depended largely on the fact that the intervenors failed to assert any claim or 
defense in their "Complaint of Applicant for Intervention." /d. at 507. 
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must bow to the interests of majority employees in having their day in 
court.47 The demise of the impermissible collateral attack doctrine in 
Wilks came as no surprise, for in Firefighters the Court already had 
made inroads into the doctrine. In Firefighters, the majority employees 
protected from preclusion by the Court were actual parties to the suit, for 
they had intervened and thus had some opportunity to present their 
views. 48 If the Supreme Court was unwilling to bind those present in the 
Firefighters suit, who had an opportunity to be heard, it was even less 
likely that they would bind the Wilks absentees, who had not even joined 
in the first suit. 
Moreover, Firefighters makes it clear that the Wilks Rule 19 solu-
tion is a hollow one. Because of Firefighters, joinder of the majority em-
ployees in Wilks could not have supplanted the impermissible collateral 
attack doctrine as a way to achieve finality of the Wilks decrees. 49 Even 
after these majority employees had been joined, they would have re-
mained free, under Firefighters, to reject any decree proposed by the 
principal parties to the case. Having rejected such proposals, the joined 
majority employees would have remained free under Firefighters to liti-
gate in that or a subsequent suit their claim that the adopted consent 
decree was unlawful. 50 
Because of Firefighters, then, joinder of the majority employees 
under Rule 19 does not solve the problem. 5 1 No joinder provision can 
bind majority employees to a consent decree to which they do not con-
sent. Rule 19 thus could not solve the finality problems that previously 
had been solved by a doctrine which-rightly or wrongly-bound all 
those who had failed to intervene in the case. 
III. A STATUTORY BAR TO UNRAVEL WILKS AND FIREFIGHTERS 
A. Section 108 
Like so many of the Supreme Court's civil rights decisions of the 
past decade, the Wilks and Firefighters cases met with a chilly reception 
47. Firefighters also presented general guidelines for when courts presented with proposed con-
sent decrees may enter them as court decrees. Such decrees must: 
I) "spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction"; 
2) fall " 'within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings' "; and 
3) "further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based." 
/d. at 525 (quoting Pacific R.R. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 297 (1880) and citing EEOC v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 799 (lOth Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980)). 
48. See discussion infra note 162 and accompanying text (limited intervention). 
49. The Court in Wilks acknowledged at the end of its opinion that Firefighters precludes 
binding those who do not join in consent decrees. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 768 (1989). 
50. Built-in protection against collateral challenges sometimes exists in such cases because 
some courts retain jurisdiction over consent decrees by orders requiring that all parties' challenges to 
the decree be brought to that court. Intervenors thus may be forced to litigate their claims in the 
original suit, rather than in an independent reverse discrimination suit. Principles of res judicata, 
moreover, might require that the intervenor raise its claim in the original suit or lose it. 
51. Intervention, of course, would not bind the unconsenting absentees to the terms of the 
decree either. Only their failure to seek intervention would bind them. 
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in Congress. In both the I 0 I st and I 02d Congresses, Congress re-
sponded with legislation. In the vetoed Civil Rights Act of 1990,52 Con-
gress made its first attempt to reactivate the employment rights recently 
curtailed by the Supreme Court. Congress sought in section 6 of the 
1990 Act to revive the impermissible collateral attack doctrine by enact-
ing it as statutory law.53 Following a veto of the 1990 Act, Congress 
succeeded, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, in overruling Wilks legisla-
tively. The 1991 version of the legislation is similar, but not identical, to 
the pertinent provision in the 1990 version. 54 
Section 108 of the 1991 Act bars two categories of employees from 
bringing separate reverse-discrimination suits to challenge affirmative ac-
tion plans arising out of employment discrimination cases: 
Category 1 bars those with sufficient notice and an opportunity 
to object at the time the decree or judgment was entered; and 
Category 2 bars those whose interests were sufficiently repre-
sented in the original suit by a person who challenged the decree or 
judgment. 55 
By barring collateral attacks, section 108 amounts to a complete re-
versal of the Wilks case. For those courts that, prior to Wilks, would 
52. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 6. Section 6 of the vetoed bill reads: 
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in paragraph (2), 
an employment practice that implements a litigated or consent judgment or order resolving a 
claim of employment discrimination under the United States Constitution or Federal civil rights 
laws may not be challenged in a claim under the United States Constitution or Federal civil 
rights laws-
(A) by a person who, prior to the entry of such judgement or order, had-
(i) notice from any source of the proposed judgment or order sufficient to apprise such 
person that such judgment or order might affect the interests of such person; and 
(ii) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judgment or order; 
(B) by a person with respect to whom the requirements of subparagraph (A) are not satis-
fied, if the court determines that the interests of such person were adequately represented by 
another person who challenged such judgment or order prior to or after the entry of such 
judgment or order; or 
(C) if the court that entered the judgment or order determines that reasonable efforts were 
made to provide notice to interested persons. 
53. As an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the statutory recission of 
Wilks (both the 1990 attempt and the 1991 enactment) revises the bar only in the employment 
discrimination context. It does not affect the broader implications of Martin v. Wilks for institu-
tional-reform litigation outside the Title VII context. See Strickler, supra note 38, at 1605. 
54. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 6 (binding those persons without actual 
notice when court found reasonable efforts to give notice had been made) with Pub. L. No. 102-166, 
sec. 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076-77 (Nov. 21, 1991) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2) (omitting 
the bar of persons without actual notice). 
55. A third category under the 1990 Act would have included those without actual notice of 
the suit if the court determined before entering the decree or judgment that reasonable efforts had 
been made to give notice to interested people. 
(C) if the court that entered the judgment or order determines that reasonable efforts were 
made to provide notice to interested persons. A determination under subparagraph (C) shall be 
made prior to the entry of the judgment or order, except that if the judgment or order was 
entered prior to the date of the enactment of this subsection, the determination may be made at 
any reasonable time. 
With regard to this third category, the 1990 Act stated without specifying procedures, that the 
notice should be consistent with the "constitutional requirements" of due process. Civil Rights Act 
of 1990, supra note 6. 
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have barred only majority employees who had declined an opportunity to 
intervene,56 section 108 expands the doctrine. Under section 108, em-
ployees who received no notice of the original suit, and thus had no op-
portunity to intervene, but whose interests were adequately represented 
by people in the first suit are barred under Category 2. 57 
The Act also expands the bar to judgments, in addition to consent 
decrees. Section 108 states that "an employment practice that imple-
ments and is within the scope of a litigated or consent judgment or order 
that resolves a claim of employment discrimination under the Constitu-
tion or Federal civil rights laws may not be challenged" by the two cate-
gories of potential plaintiffs described above. Thus, employees cannot 
collaterally challenge any employment practice put in place as a result of 
litigation, whether the practice was agreed to in a consent decree or or-
dered by the court pursuant to a trial. The expansion of the doctrine to 
encompass judgments may have no effect on analysis of the doctrine's 
constitutionality. In his dissent to denial of certiorari in Ashley v. City of 
Jackson, then Associate Justice Rehnquist suggested that binding an ab-
sentee by a judgment is less harmful than binding by a decree, because 
the former is at least based upon objective adjudication by the court, 
while the latter "is little more than a contract between the parties."58 
There is reason to believe that section 108 would pass muster with 
the Chief Justice, who drafted the Wilks opinion, in which the common 
law version of the bar failed. The Wilks decision rested principally upon 
an apparent conflict between the collateral attack bar and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than upon any conflict between the bar 
and the Due Process Clause. Although the Chief Justice began the Wilks 
discussion with a due process reference, he devoted most of his opinion 
to arguing that the impermissible collateral attack doctrine was inconsis-
tent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, governing intervention, be-
cause the judicial doctrine required intervention, whereas the rule 
rendered intervention voluntary.59 In fact, because the Wilks opinion 
actually finds significance in the absence of a legislative scheme to bind 
absentees, the opinion appears to invite the adoption of such a scheme in 
this context. Yet, the absence of any thorough due process analysis of 
the bar in Wilks leaves open the threat that the Supreme Court is reserv-
ing its due process arsenal for review of the statutory bar that was likely 
to be, and has now been, enacted in the wake of Wilks. 60 If the Court 
had fully addressed due process problems in the judicial bar, Congress 
56. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
51. In addition, majority employees who received no notice and whose interests were not rep-
resented are barred under Category 3 as long as constitutionally sufficient, albeit unsuccessful, efforts 
at notice had been made. 
58. Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900, 902 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
59. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763-67 (1989). 
60. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in proffering the idea that a legislatively enacted bar would com-
port with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, cautioned that such a legislative scheme would come 
under the Court's due process scrutiny. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762 n.2. The issue received more thor-
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might have tailored any responsive legislation to avoid the identified due 
process pitfalls. As it is, the Supreme Court left itself a broad berth in 
this area when it decided Wilks. 
B. The Statutory Bar's Constitutionality 
If the statutory bar is unconstitutional, it is because those who were 
neither parties to a lawsuit nor in privity with the parties to the suit 
cannot as a rule be bound by the resulting judgment consistently with 
due process.61 There are, however, notable exceptions to this fundamen-
tal res judicata principle. 62 These exceptions come into play when fac-
tors other than the nonparties' presence and participation in the lawsuit 
assuage due process concerns and when interests in finality surmount the 
interest in guarding against any remaining threats to due process. 63 Of 
the exceptions recognized at common law, the one relevant here is the 
exception for absentees who were adequately represented by a party.64 
ough treatment in Justice Rehnquist's 1983 opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari in Ashley, 
464 U.S. at 900 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
61. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979); see also Mann v. City of 
Albany, 883 F.2d 999, 1003 (lith Cir. 1989); United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1260 
(7th Cir. 1989) (citing Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438 (1940)); Insurance Co. of North Am. v. 
Bay, 784 F.2d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 738 F.2d 
209, 213 (7th Cir. 1984). Res judicata-consisting of claim preclusion and issue preclusion-does 
preclude those who are parties to the consent decree from challenging the decree. Firefighters v. 
City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 522 (1986); United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 
(1971). As a general principle, "'one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in 
which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of 
process.'" Wilks , 490 U.S. at 761 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)); see, e.g., 
Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 327 n.7. The crucial underpinning for the Court's decision in 
Wilks was that "a judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but 
it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings.'' Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762. This 
principle derives from the due process requirement that a person subjected to a threat of loss be 
given notice of the case against him and a meaningful opportunity to present his position. See 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
62. Sometimes due process is deemed satisfied even when the minimums of notice and opportu-
nity to be heard are not met. "Because protection of this opportunity [to litigate] is a matter of 
Constitutional right, [see, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 
{1971); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 321 
(1971)], the exceptions to the general rule are carefully defined." FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY 
C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 11.22, at 629 (3d ed. 1985). See infra note 64 for a listing of 
these exceptions. 
63. See Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66, 69 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
1003 (1983). 
64. The common law recognizes three broad categories of persons who are excepted from the 
rule against binding absentees. The first category consists of those who have been represented by a 
party to the suit. This exception "has its roots in a few limited classes of relationships, involving, for 
example, '[t]rustees, executors, statutory representatives in death and survival actions, and guardi-
ans.'" 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 4448, at 408 (2d 
ed. 1987). The Court has extended this category of exceptions to apply to class actions, see Han-
sberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), and litigation undertaken by collective bargaining representatives. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 61, at 117-18 (1980). The second category encom-
passes those standing in a legal relationship with a party such that it is fair to bind the absentee. /d. 
§ 62, at 125. This category includes those in privity with a party. The third category of nonparties 
who may be bound includes nonparties who controlled a party's conduct in the original litigation to 
such an extent that it is fair to treat the nonparty as if he had been a party. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., 
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The inquiry with respect to the section 108 bar is whether it fits within 
this exception to due process limitations on preclusion. It might be asked 
at the outset why due process protections are even necessary when courts 
preclude white employees from challenging consent decrees. The argu-
ment has been made that what is happening here is not truly "preclu-
sion, anyway. Rather, it is argued, a judgment or decree can have a 
practical effect on one's interests without having a res judicata effect on 
any legal claim.65 This was, in fact, one of the premises underlying Jus-
tice Stevens's dissent in Martin v. Wilks. Justice Stevens concluded that 
no res judicata effect was occurring in Wilks because there was only an 
indirect effect on the interests of majority employees.66 Justice Stevens 
supra,§ 4451, at 427-28. Only the first of these three exceptions (encompassing those whose inter-
ests were adequately represented in the original suit) is relevant to sec. 108, and then only relevant to 
Category 2. In addition, courts make exceptions for certain absentees as to whom "reasonable" 
efforts at notice have been made under the Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust principle. Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (notice by publication to unknown benefi-
ciaries is sufficient). 
65. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 62, § 11.22, at 630. This means that absentees, though not 
legally bound by the consent decree, may be affected by the decree by, for example, practical changes 
at the workplace that may have the effect of eliminating or altering their prospects for promotions, 
hiring, pay raises, etc. In his dissent in Wilks, Justice Stevens made reference to the "practical 
effect" of judgments, stating, "[t]he fact that one of the effects of a decree is to curtail the job oppor-
tunities of nonparties does not mean that the nonparties have been deprived of legal rights or that 
they have standing to appeal from that [consent] decree without becoming parties." Martin v. 
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 771 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). These effects on the nonparty are not the 
result of res judicata rules as such. They are the result of the fact that a judgment not only deter-
mines issues and claims but also may redefine the relationships of the parties to the litigation with 
respect to each other, with respect to property, and with respect to their future courses of conduct. 
It is suggested that the judgment thus operates much like a privately negotiated contract or convey-
ance as far as nonparties are concerned. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 62, § 11.23, at 631. 
The Mullane case discussed below, see infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text, actually dis-
tinguishes between those who are named parties to the suit, thus requiring personal notice, and those 
whose interests are impaired though they are not named as parties. The level of notice required for 
these two categories may differ, but both groups deserve some protection under the Due Process 
Clause. 
66. Justice Stevens states that the decree does not bind absentees but only affects them, and 
draws analogy to the issuance of a valid search warrant serving as evidence of good faith. Thus, 
Justice Stevens equates the decree's effect in the Wilks case to a "good faith" argument. In fact, 
however, all the "good faith" in the world will not excuse an employer who is choosing people for 
promotions based on their races. The very fact that race is the characteristic used to select a 
promotee is enough to amount to a Title VII violation. And the presence of benign motives nor-
mally will not take such an employer decision outside the reach of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 
(1988). See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987). Defenses are available to employers 
who are caught basing decisions on race, but "good faith" is not one of them. Nevertheless, Justice 
Stevens writes that what matters here is that the employer had good reason for its decision-the 
consent decree. To have a "good reason" in the disparate treatment context means to have a reason 
other than race, not an excuse for using race as the reason. 
Justice Stevens found that the true basis for the lower court's opinion was that the court had 
found the City guilty of discrimination, establishing the Weber predicates for affirmative action. At 
the close of the opinion, he actually wrote that, by virtue of the trial on discrimination issues, the 
whites had had their day in court. It is difficult to understand why this should make any difference. 
Even if the court had made a finding of fact that discrimination had occurred, that finding should 
not have any impact on an absentee who is bringing a suit that puts that fact at issue. Only if it is 
recognized that a collateral attack bar precludes the absentee's inde{lendent suit will the result of the 
first suit have an impact on the absentee's suit. The idea that one cannot attack a consent decree, 
Justice Stevens writes, was only an alternative holding: Justice Stevens writes that "(n]owhere in the 
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actually agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist that it would not be permis-
sible to bind an absentee in the res judicata sense, but argued that what 
was happening in Wilks was not preclusion. As discussed below, how-
ever, and despite Justice Stevens's protestations to the contrary, the effect 
of barring a subsequent majority suit is preclusive in nature, requiring 
due process protections. 
Justice Stevens suggested that "[t]he fact that one of the effects of a 
decree is to curtail the job opportunities of non parties does not mean that 
the nonparties have been deprived of legal rights."67 This is correct be-
cause curtailment of majority employees' job opportunities is an inevita-
ble and legitimate result of many affirmative action consent decrees. 68 
What the majority employees sought to challenge in Wilks, however, was 
not the legitimate "curtailment of job opportunities," but rather an alleg-
edly unlawful consent decree so violative of majority rights that the ma-
jority possessed a legal cause of action to challenge it. In Justice 
Stevens's view, the consent decree could serve as a complete defense to an 
action properly brought by majority employees to challenge the decree as 
unlawful. 69 If a decree can so thwart a subsequent majority employee 
suit, surely its effect must be termed "preclusive."70 If a bar is required, 
then there must be a legal claim to bar. Barring those majority employ-
ees who possess causes of action constitutes real preclusion and an excep-
tion to the usual rule against precluding nonparties. Because the bar's 
effect is indeed preclusive, it must be encompassed in an exception71 to 
District Court's lengthy findings of fact and conclusions of law is there a single word suggesting that 
respondents were bound by the consent decree." Wilks, 490 U.S. at 782 (Steven~. J., dissenting). 
The effect of the lower court's decision was to preclude challenges to actions taken under the decree, 
regardless of whether that was called "res judicata," "binding," or by some other designation. 
67. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 771 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). In cases in which the nonparty has a 
claim, the nonparty simply may bring the claim in a second suit and avoid the first judgment by 
asserting that res judicata cannot bind a nonparty. Only when the nonparty lacks an assertible 
claim, experiencing only a practical impairment of interest, is he limited, as Justice Stevens argues, to 
asserting fraud or lack of jurisdiction in challenging the decree. /d. at 771-72 (Stevens, J ., dissent-
ing); see JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 62, § 12.15, at 681. It has been argued that limitations on 
collateral attacks do not apply in these situations because "[a]n attack by a nonparty is not collateral; 
the nonparty did not have his day in court." United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1262 
(7th Cir. 1989); see also Kramer, supra note 1, at 332 (term "collateral attack" ordinarily refers to 
party's attempt to avoid judgment rendered against that party in different action). 
68. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
69. In fact, the nonparty majority employees in Wilks and similar cases do have a colorable 
cause of action, which is to say the employees have alleged that their legal rights have been violated. 
Specifically, the majority employees would allege, for example, that the employer promoted Jones 
instead of Smith because Jones was black and Smith was white. This states a cause of action under 
Title VII and the Constitution. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). In 
this context, then, the binding effect of the decree is not only practical, it is also legal. 
70. George M. Strickler, Jr., in an article entitled "Martin v. Wilks," has reached a similar 
conclusion. Strickler, supra note 38, at 1575. 
71. It may be argued that such exceptions to the rules of res judicata are strictly an area for 
legislative prerogative. The judicial collateral attack bar has been criticized as judicial legislating. 
See Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762 n.2 (citing NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 529-30 n.lO 
(1984)). It has also been argued that any scheme designed to bind absentees by giving them notice 
consistent with Mullane need not necessarily be enacted legislatively, but may instead be created as 
judicial doctrine. Strickler, supra note 38, at 1604-05. But see Kramer, supra note 1, at 335. In 
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the res judicata principle that protects the due process rights of those 
barred. Under such due process scrutiny, the preclusion in section 108 is 
straightforward and fair. 72 
The first section 108 category embodies the old judicial collateral 
attack bar in its purest form. Notice has been given to the absentee ma-
jority employees in such a way that they have had a meaningful opportu-
nity to intervene or otherwise present their objections. 73 Given that the 
bar here is limited to those afforded these protections, this portion of 
section 108 should easily pass constitutional muster.74 The bar does not 
keep the majority employees from having their day in court, but only sets 
the date for their appearance. As one commentator has stated, "allowing 
a party to be heard on the merits only if he satisfies [the Rule 24 interven-
tion] requirements does not deprive that party of due process" any more 
than imposition of a statute of limitations does. 75 
The second section 108 category, which binds absentees whose inter-
ests were adequately represented by those present in the suit, reflects an 
area of constitutionally permissible preclusion under the Supreme Court 
case of Hansberry v. Lee.76 Category 2 preclusion has the same effect as 
Mullane, the reasonable notice attempts, which the Court deemed capable under due process of 
binding absentees, were made pursuant to statutory authorization. This factor may well have signifi· 
cance, for states' interests, expressed legislatively, have, over the years, played an increasing role in 
due process analysis in related areas. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 
(1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nationales de Colombia 
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). But see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Professor Strickler 
cites the case of Roffman-La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989), for the contrary proposition. 
Although it is true that the Supreme Court, in Sperling, upheld the power of federal courts to au-
thorize notice to absent class members, Sperling was not a case in which a court sought to bind such 
absentees solely by virtue of the court +directed notice. /d. Thus, despite Sperling, fashioning a bar 
predicated upon Mullane notice may be beyond the power of the courts. The Supreme Court has 
struck down the judicial collateral attack bar as beyond the scope of permissible preclusion, so any 
judicial activity to recreate the bar would need to emanate from the Supreme Court. 
72. The third category under the vetoed 1990 Act, persons without notice, but as to whom 
notice efforts were made, was more troubling, but courts could have construed it to achieve due 
process as well. 
73. See Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided court, 
484 U.S. 301 (1988). The constitutionality of binding absentees based on their receipt of notice and 
an unexercised opportunity to intervene has been the subject of discussion by commentators. 
Charles J. Cooper, The Collateral Attack Doctrine and the Rules of Intervention: A Judicial Pincer 
Movement on Due Process, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 155, 171 (presuming consistency with due pro-
cess by analogy to statutes of limitation); see also Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2104 
Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 553-54 (1990) 
[hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of Constitu-
tional Law, Harvard University Law School). 
74. "[T]here is no fundamental unfairness in precluding post-hoc challenges by individuals 
who had actual notice that their interests might be adversely affected and an opportunity to make 
those challenges at the time of the litigation." Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 554 (statement of 
Prof. Laurence Tribe); see Kramer, supra note I, at 340-41 (opportunity to intervene is constitution-
ally sufficient "opportunity to be heard"). 
75. Kramer, supra note 1, at 339. But see Recktenwald, supra note 11, at 179. "[T]he only 
prerequisite of estopping someone in this situation is the existence of procedures comporting with 
due process-that is actual notice and an opportunity to be heard." Senate Hearings, supra note 73, 
at 556 (statement of Prof. Laurence Tribe). 
76. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Courts already have treated adequate representation as an adequate 
ground to bar absentees from raising challenges to a decree. In Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 
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that of Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which bind absent, unnotified class members whose interests have 
been protected by a class representative. If these portions of Rule 23 are 
constitutional, then so is the Category 2 bar. 77 The courts have been 
deemed qualified to assess adequacy of representation in the Rule 23 con-
text and should be equally competent in the section 108 context.78 
Drafters of the 1991 Act succeeded in ridding the legislation of a 
1990 provision that most likely would have subjected the legislation to 
constitutional challenge. The third category of preclusion under the 
1990 Act would have bound employees who neither received notice nor 
(presumably) were adequately represented, but as to whom adequate ef-
forts at notice had been made. To read the category as it was written, 
however, to bind those who neither received notice nor were adequately 
represented, might have violated the constitutional principles set forth in 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust. 19 
In Mullane, the Supreme Court set forth the constitutional standard 
for binding persons who had not received actual notice of a suit. The 
Court indicated that a "reasonable-under-the-circumstances" test should 
govern the notice issue. The Mullane Court went on to hold that notice 
by publication represented a constitutionally sufficient effort at notice 
even to bind unidentified absentees not actually reached by the notice in 
that case. So far, this sounds consistent with the Category 3 scenario. 
One part of the Mullane Court's rationale, however, was that a trustee 
had appeared in the suit on behalf of the unidentified absentees in that 
case and had adequately represented their interests. 80 Thus, the Mullane 
578 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1978), the court looked at the question of whether some majority employees 
could intervene to challenge a consent decree. Separate suits already had been rejected as impermis-
sible collater::ll challenges. ld. at 917. The court looked at the question of whether the absentees had 
been represented adequately separately from the Rule 24 issue of adequacy of representation. I d. at 
918-19. The court apparently viewed the absentees as bound in the res judicata sense solely because 
their interests had been adequately represented. The fact that a party has 
champion[ed] the position asserted by another in a subsequent action is a factor to consider in 
determining whether the later party is a privy of the earlier party, Aerojet-General Corp. v. 
Askew, 511 F.2d 710,719 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975), but this factor alone has 
never been considered sufficient to warrant denying the later party his day in court [under res 
judicata principles] . . .. 
Mann v. City of Albany, 883 F.2d 999, 1003 (lith Cir. 1989) (citing 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 
64, § 4457, at 495). 
77. See Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 558-59 (statement of Prof. Laurence Tribe). 
78. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 23 advisory committee's notes, 1966 amends. 
79. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Mullane concerned the constitutional sufficiency of notice given to 
trust beneficiaries in a case involving an accounting of trust assets. The Court held that what the 
reasonableness standard requires depends on the facts. Of the three categories of interest in the 
litigation, the Court held that 
1) those whose names and addresses were known should be mailed notice, and not simply given 
notice by publication; 
2) those whose names and addresses were not known could be notified by publication; and 
3) those who could not be identified but who potentially were interested could be notified by 
publication-if even that was required. 
ld. at 317-18. 
80. /d. at 318-19. 
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test may require both that reasonable effort has been made to notify the 
absentees and that the interests of the absentees somehow have been pro-
tected in the originallitigation.81 
If Category 3's reference to "constitutional requirements" incorpo-
rated this construction of the Mullane standard, then Category 3 
amounted to little more than a restatement and expansion of Category 2, 
which requires adequate representation of the absentees in order for them 
to be bound. If Category 3 had covered situations beyond those covered 
by Category 2, then Category 3 would have reached unnotified persons 
whose interests had not been represented adequately by parties in the 
first suit. Such a result would have violated the construction of Mullane 
described above by binding absentees who had absolutely no idea nor 
reason to know that the original suit was under way and whose interests 
were not represented before the court in that suit. 82 By barring these 
would-be challengers who lacked notice and were unrepresented, 83 then, 
the 1990 Act would have provided a ready target for constitutional 
challenge. 
81. In a statement to the Senate Committee considering § 6 of the 1990 bill, Professor Tribe 
stated: 
Where any efforts at notice would almost certainly be futile, Mullane may mean either that 
those who could not possibly have been notified-e.g., generations yet unborn--<:annot possibly 
be bound by the judgment or, far more plausibly, that such individuals may be bound so long as 
it would not be fundamentally unfair to treat them as "represented" de facto by those who did 
receive notice and made the relevant challenges. 
Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 557 (statement of Prof. Laurence Tribe). 
Other aspects of Mullane appear to comport with the employment discrimination scenario 
under discussion. For example, Mullane entailed special circumstances in which the state had an 
interest in resolving certain trust matters with finality. Similarly, here, the federal interest in finality 
of decrees and judgments effectuating Title VII is strong. 
82. Such absentees might include individuals who were not employees at the time of the suit. 
It may sometimes make sense to notify persons with pending job applications, and to certify 
representatives of the class of all present and future job applicants who might be affected by the 
quota. But status as an applicant for work with a particular employer is often short-lived, and 
an applicant's stake with any particular employer is often small. The court can notify current 
applicants, but it certainly cannot rely on them to represent a class. Current applicants argua-
bly, and future applicants certainly, are like the remaindermen in Mullane. They do not have to 
be notified individually, but if they are to be bound, the court must appoint a guardian ad litem 
to represent their interests. 
Laycock, supra note 21, at 148-49 (citing In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., 795 F.2d 265, 275 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1043 (3d Cir. 1985), 
a./f'd, 908 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
83. When the 1990 Act was pending before Congress, efforts to ameliorate these perceived 
threats to due process resulted in a final hour amendment to§ 6 of the 1990 bill. This amendment 
preserved the Category 1-3 preclusion, but limited such preclusion to those who seek to challenge 
decrees entered before enactment of the 1990 Act and up to 30 days after its passage. The bar on 
challenges to post-Act decrees would have been more limited. With one exception, the amendment 
precluded challenges on post-Act decrees only by individuals who, prior to entry of the decree, were 
employees, former employees, or applicants. For these categories of individuals, the prerequisites for 
preclusion largely duplicated two of the three categories of preclusion for pre-Act decree challenges. 
Thus, an employee with adequate notice of the decree could have been precluded, as could employ-
ees who received no notice where adequate efforts at notice had been made. The amendment actu-
ally would have enhanced protections for these challengers, for it specified the quality of notice the 
would-be challenger had to have received. 
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IV. WHAT IS A COURT To Do? PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF 
MAJORITY EMPLOYEES 
As enacted, the collateral attack bar seldom should operate to the 
detriment of majority employees. By its terms, the Act limits the bar to 
those majority employees whose interests are protected. Courts may, 
with good reason, therefore find themselves focusing more on the prob-
lem of gaps in the statutory bar that will permit ongoing majority chal-
lenges to entered decrees than on any problems of fairness to the narrow 
class of majority employees actually barred by the enacted provision. 
The remainder of this article considers two very different types of mecha-
nisms that can operate together to assure the finality of consent decrees 
by safeguarding majority employees' interests. The first type includes 
mechanisms that allow majority employees to become involved in the 
original discrimination suit between the minority employees and the em-
ployer. These mechanisms-intervention and Rule 19 joinder-are both 
governed by existing federal rules of civil procedure. Because of the Cat-
egory 1 bar against those who have had an opportunity to be heard, the 
article advocates a liberal interpretation of the intervention rules, consis-
tent with existing precedent, to ease and encourage majority employee 
involvement. By easing the majority employees' involvement in the first 
suit, courts subsequently confronted with collateral challenges to the de-
cree that resolves that suit can, in good conscience, impose the bar be-
cause those barred have had "a reasonable opportunity to present 
objections to such judgment or order."84 The article goes on to suggest 
that application of Rule 19, by contrast, usually should result in nonjoin-
der. The second type of mechanism proposed in the article seeks to as-
sure consent decree finality through modifications of the fairness hearing 
preceding the court's entry of the decree. These modifications would en-
sure such careful scrutiny that majority employees not barred by section 
l 08 will lack grounds to challenge the decree. 
A. Easing Majority Involvement in the Original Suit 
The best way to avert collateral challenges to consent decrees is to 
protect majority employees' interests by involving them or their repre-
sentatives in the original suit. Two mechanisms for involving majority 
employees are viable: one is intervention of right85 under Rule 24, and 
84. Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076 (Nov. 21, 1991) (amending the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 § 703(n)(l)(B)(i)(II), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h (1988)). 
85. Rule 24(a) provides as follows: 
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene 
in an action: (I) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; 
or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 
subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the 
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for permissive 
intervention when the criteria for intervention of right are not met. FED. R. C1v. P. 24(b). The 
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the other is joinder as necessary or indispem~able parties under Rule 19.86 
By cutting off certain subsequent challenges to a decree, the statutory bar 
presents potential for impact on the availability of both of these mecha-
nisms. By making collateral challenges available to those not protected 
in the decree suit, the bar also increases the importance of joining the 
majority employees. 
1. Intervention Prospects Under Section 108 
Category 1 of section 108 precludes challenges by employees who 
have had notice and "a reasonable opportunity to ·present objections. " 87 
Nonparties may receive such an opportunity by petitioning for interven-
tion. Intervention is a procedural device that permits an outsider to seek 
court has the power to grant permissive intervention as long as the applicant's claim or defense has a 
question of law or fact in common with the main action. ld. The decision of whether to grant 
permissive intervention is within the court's discretion. Because the majority employees appear to 
have a clear right to intervene, this article does not consider application of Rule 24(b). If a court 
were to find no intervention right, it should grant permissive intervention because of the likelihood 
that prejudice to the majority employees will result in challenges to the decree. Cf. Ionian Shipping 
Co. v. British Law Ins. Co., 426 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 1970). 
86. Rule 19 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(a) Persons to Be Joined If Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and 
whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action 
shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be 
accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject 
of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) 
as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave 
any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or 
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been 
so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a 
plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an 
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that party would render 
the venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described in 
subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in eq-
uity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be 
dismissed, the absent person being. thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered 
by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be 
prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective 
provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be 
lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be ade-
quate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for 
nonjoinder. 
FED. R. CJV. P. 19. Joinder under either Rule 19 or Rule 24 would qualify as an .. opportunity to be 
heard" under Category 1 of sec.' 108. See supra text accompanying note 52. Professor Kramer has 
argued that an appropriate mechanism for joining the absentees would be to permit them to file suits 
and transfer those suits to the judge presiding over the minority suit, who could then consolidate the 
cases. Kramer, supra note 1, at 335. When the bar against collateral attacks in the 1990 legislation 
would have foreclosed this possibility, Professor Kramer advocated enactment of a provision of§ 6 
(now contained in sec. 108 of the enacted statute) requiring that any collateral attacks permitted be 
brought in front of the judge handling the minority suit and that such challenges be consolidated 
with the minority suit to avoid duplication of effort. Joint Hearings on H.R. 4000, The Civil Rights 
Act of 1990 Before the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 474-75 (1990) {hereinafter 
House Hearings] (statement of Prof. Larry Kramer). 
87. Courts may decide that the mere opportunity to petition for intervention constitutes .. a 
reasonable opportunity t9 present objections" or may instead require that the majority employees 
either appear informally at a fairness hearing or actually become parties. 
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permission to join a lawsuit. 88 This device leaves the burden on the out-
sider to recognize that the suit may impair his interests. Once the out-
sider succeeds in intervening, he has the full rights and obligations of any 
other party. 89 
Absent the statutory bar, employees who could be affected adversely 
by an affirmative action consent decree either may try to intervene or 
may lodge a separate challenge in court after the decree is entered. 90 
Under the pre-Wilks judicial bar, courts frequently dismissed these post 
hoc challenges as impermissible collateral attacks on the consent decree. 
Courts rejecting such challenges often remarked that the challenger's 
"proper course . . . would have been to intervene in the lawsuit from 
which the consent decree issued."91 Such statements may seem to sug-
gest that intervention was a reliable method for obtaining access to the 
proceedings leading up to a consent decree. Motions to intervene in such 
cases, however, often were unsuccessful for failure to meet particular re-
quirements imposed by Rule 24.92 Despite the failures of some majority 
employees' efforts to intervene in the original minority suits, there were 
times when the potential for imposition of the judicial collateral attack 
bar itself enabled the majority employees to meet the Rule 24 require-
88. FED. R. Ctv. P. 24. Many consider intervention to be the better route for joinder of major-
ity employees in employment discrimination suits. See Strickler, supra note 38, at 1592-98. 
89. Kirkland v. New York Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1983), cert 
denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); 3B JAMES MOORE & JOHN E. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE~ 24.16[1], at 24-155 (2d ed. 1991). Thus, if majority employees intervene (or are otherwise 
joined) in a case that concludes in an adjudicated judgment, principles of res judicata will estop them 
to the same extent as any other party. See Vreeland, supra note 24, at 308 n. l5l. Recall, however, 
that a party (whether joined by intervention or otherwise) who does not join in a consent decree 
cannot be bound thereby. Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986). 
90. Because decree-entering courts often retain jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the 
decree, see, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1257 (7th Cir. 1989), employees 
seeking to alter or enjoin the decree should seek intervention, and those seeking damages can obtain 
what they want as easily through a separate suit. ld. at 1258. 
91. Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Dennison v. City of Los Ange-
les Dep't of Water & Power, 658 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 1981)), aff'd by an equally divided court, 
484 U.S. 301 (1988); see also Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66, 68 (5th Cir. 1982), cert 
denied , 464 U.S. 900 (1983); Black & White Children of the Pontiac Sch. Sys. v. School Dist. , 464 
F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1972). Cj Stritf v. Mason, 849 F.ld 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1988) (district court 
should have permitted Stritf to intervene to present his claim). 
92. Jones v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 704 F .2d 206 (5th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 675 F.2d 164 {8th Cir. 1982); Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15 {1st Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 553 F .2d 451 {5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 {1978). 
In Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900 (1983), Justice Rehnquist discussed the unfairness of 
denying intervention on timeliness grounds when, as in that case, the parties' cause of action arose 
from the consent decree, yet did not accrue until one year after entry of the decree. Id. at 902 
{Rehnquist, J ., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Rehnquist went on to 
draw a parallel with consent decrees entered between private corporations and the Government to 
resolve antitrust violations: 
Surely, the existence of that decree does not preclude a future suit by another corporation alleg-
ing that the defendant company's conduct, even if authorized by the decree, constitutes an 
antitrust violation. The nonparty has an independent right to bring his own private antitrust 
action for treble damages or injunctive relief. 
ld. at 902. 
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ments.93 With the advent of the mandatory statutory bar in section 108, 
courts should more readily, and perhaps presumptively, allow interven-
tion in cases seeking institutional affirmative action. This section ana-
lyzes how the Rule 24 intervention criteria should apply when section 
I 08 bars collateral attacks on consent decrees. 94 
Rule 24 provides four criteria for analyzing a petition to intervene as 
of right.95 The applicant must show that: (I) the applicant has a qualify-
ing interest; (2) disposition of the action may impair or impede the appli-
cant's ability to protect that interest; (3) existing parties do not represent 
the interest adequately; and (4) the application is timely.96 The first three 
of these criteria clearly point to the intervention of majority employees 
who will be barred from filing an independent suit to challenge an affirm-
ative action consent decree. The fourth criterion is more troublesome, 
but, as discussed below, usually should favor intervention as well. 
a. Qualifying Interest Requirement 
Courts construe the interest requirement of Rule 24(a) expansively 
in order to achieve judicial economy and afford due process.97 Thus, the 
District of Columbia Circuit has characterized "'the "interest" test [as] 
primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many 
apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due 
93. See infra note 110. 
94. At first blush, sec. 108 may appear itself to answer the question of how Rule 24 should 
apply in these cases. Section 108 provides that nothing in sec. 108 should "be construed to alter the 
standards for intervention under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." See supra note 8 
(text of statute). The Act might, therefore, be deemed to "freeze" the intervention scenario as that 
scenario stood before passage of the Act. One must distinguish, however, between preserving the 
standards for intervention and preserving the end result of application of those standards. The Act 
requires the former and not the latter. By barring collateral attacks, sec. 108 alters the factual 
situation upon which Rule 24 operates, and thus will certainly affect the outcome resulting from 
application of the preserved Rule 24 standards. Section 108 does not, however, resolve the vital 
inquiry of what impact the collateral attack bar should have on the outcome of Rule 24 analysis. 
95. This article considers the problem of intervention as of right, though a court has considera-
ble discretion to permit intervention if it chooses. See FED. R. CJV. P. 24(b); supra note 85. Unlike 
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), intervention of right does not require the court to consider 
the extent to which those already parties may be prejudiced by the intervention or the extent to 
which intervention would delay the proceedings. FED. R. CJV. P. 24(b). In the employment dis-
crimination consent decree context, this is significant because intervention by a majority employee 
whose only interest was in forestalling settlement would severely prejudice the interests of those 
already parties in settling the suit. 
96. FED. R. CJV. P. 24(a). 
97. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see also Cascade Natural Gas Corp. 
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967). But see Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 
531 ( 1971 ). The effect of the employer's alleged discrimination need not rise to the level of depriving 
the petitioner of a constitutionally cognizable property right. United States v. City of Chicago, 870 
F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Cascade Natural Gas Corp. , 386 U.S. at 135-36); Bethune 
Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 1988); Harris v. Pemsley, 820 F .2d 592, 600-01 
(3d Cir. 1987); Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 958-59 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 
560 (1989); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. l, 738 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 
1984) (per curiam); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341 (lOth Cir. 1978); EEOC v. AT&T, 506 F.2d 735, 741-42 (3d Cir. 1974). 
See generally Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415. 
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process.' " 98 There are, however, some limits on what qualifies as an "in-
terest" for purposes of Rule 24(a). The Supreme Court in Donaldson v. 
United States specified that, to qualify, an interest must be "significantly 
protectable."99 By "significantly protectable," the Donaldson Court ap-
parently meant two things: (1) that the interest should be one that courts 
properly would recognize as worthy of the court's protection; and (2) 
that the appropriate occasion for that protection is the time of the law 
suit in which intervention is sought, rather than in some future case. 100 
One problem with the Donaldson discussion is that it confuses impair-
ment of the intervenor's interest (the first Rule 24 criterion) with impair-
ment of the intervenor's ability to protect that interest (the second Rule 
24 criterion). In fact, the impairment concept forms part of the "inter-
est" analysis of the first prong, as well as constituting the second prong. 
What is being impaired under each prong, however, is different. Under 
the first criterion-"interest"-the impairment . in question is the in-
fringement of the majority employees' substantive right not to be victims 
of unlawful discrimination. 101 The impairment at issue under the second 
Rule 24 criterion is not infringement of the intervenors' substantive legal 
rights. Rather, assuming that their substantive interests are indeed 
threatened, prong two asks whether the intervenors will be able to sue or 
otherwise take action to protect against the threatened infringement. 
The two aspects of the first Rule 24 criterion under the Donaldson "inter-
est" inquiry, then, should be (1) whether the interest is a legal interest-
one the infringement of which is likely to give rise to a cause of action; 
and (2) whether it appears likely that the original suit will indeed infringe 
that interest. 
The outcome of a court's applying Donaldson to ascertain whether 
majority employees have an adequate interest in the case is not clear. 
Applying the first part of the Donaldson rule to the would-be majority 
employee intervenors, it should be beyond argument that the interest of 
employees who expect to be treated illegally pursuant to a consent decree 
qualifies for court protection. 102 In the consent decree context, the sec-
ond aspect of the interest requirement asks whether the would-be inter-
98. Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting Nuesse v. Camp, 385 
F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967)); see also Cascade Natural Gas Corp., 386 U.S. at 129. 
99. Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 531. 
100. See id. 
101. This requirement that the interest be threatened actually has two aspects itself: is the de· 
cree likely to infringe the interest, and is the interest a real one in that the benefit of which the decree 
will deprive the plaintiff is a benefit that plaintiff would be likely to enjoy absent the decree. See 
United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th Cir. 1989). See generally Tobias, supra 
note 97. 
102. Cf. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 710-71 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (consent decree 
cannot deprive majority of their right not to be victims of discrimination). Where this is the same 
interest that gave rise to the suit initially, albeit based on different acts of discrimination from the 
original claim, permitting the majority employees to intervene is especially in keeping with the rule's 
goal of efficiency. Cj Foster, 655 F.2d at 1324-25. Of course, varying forms of affirmative action 
intrude on the interests of the majority to varying degrees. See Schwarzschild, supra note l, at 909-
10. 
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venor will be likely to or actually will suffer unlawful discrimination as a 
result of the decree. Some courts have gone so far as to require that the 
would-be intervenor actually become a victim of discrimination pursuant 
to the decree in order to establish an adequate interest for purposes of 
Rule 24.103 In Howard v. McLucas, 104 for example, the Eleventh Circuit 
permitted intervention only conditionally, pending the intervenors' 
showing that they indeed were denied promotions unlawfully as a result 
of the decree; a potentially injured interest was deemed insufficient to 
support intervention to challenge the decree. tos Other circuits similarly 
have specified that the would-be intervenor must, when he seeks inter-
vention, have such an interest as to give him standing to bring an action 
of his own. 106 The question, then, is how certain injury to the interest 
must be in order to qualify the majority employees as having an interest 
at all. An interest in not being a victim of unlawful reverse discrimina-
tion carries little weight under Rule 24 if the pertinent consent decree is 
unlikely to infringe that interest. 107 
Courts entering consent decrees are unlikely to enter decrees delib-
erately in derogation of the legal rights of nonparty majority employ-
ees. 108 Thus, any district court that enters a decree does so believing that 
a subsequent suit to challenge the decree's legality would fail because no 
infringement of the absentee's interest will result from the decree. Such 
courts may be inclined, therefore, not to recognize the majority employ-
ees' interest as one adequately threatened to meet the interest require-
ment of Rule 24. Precisely because courts are likely to view a decision in 
103. Some courts have held that "claims that a consent decree resulted in reverse discrimination 
could not accrue until those seeking redress were denied promotions." Howard v. McLucas, 871 
F.2d 1000, 1005 (lith Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 560 (1989). As discussed below, to delay availa-
bility of intervention until the promotions are actually denied could nullify Rule 24's opportunities, 
especially combined with a strict reading of. Rule 24's timeliness requirement. 
104. 871 F.2d 1000 (lith Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 560 (1989) .. The court cited In re Bir-
mingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation, 833 F.2d 1492, 1498-99 (lith Cir. 1987), 
aff'd sub nom . Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), for the proposition that an action does not 
accrue until the white employee has actually been denied a promotion. Howard, 811 F.2d at 1005. 
The In re Birmingham court had announced that proposition to demonstrate that the white employ-
ees in that Case could not be bound by a consent decree in an earlier case to which the whites had not 
been party, particularly in light ofthe fact that the whites' action had not even accrued at the time of 
the earlier decree. In re Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 1499. 
lOS. Howard, 811 F.2d at 1003. 
106. Southern Christian Leadership v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 717, 780-81 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United 
States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Francis v. Chamber of Commerce, 481 F.2d 
192, 195 n.7 (4th Cir. 1973); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 463 F.2d 1261, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
107. In the analogous case of Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1989), the First 
Circuit placed heavy weight on the fact that the would-be intervenors would not be prejudiced by 
their exclusion from the suit, even given the judicial collateral attack bar, because the court believed 
the would-be intervenors were unlikely to win a subsequent suit, even if collateral attack were avail-
able. /d. at 22-23. The Culbreath discussion was in connection with the prejudice prong of Rule 
24's timeliness requirement, but reflects the same concern that the interest under Rule 24 must truly 
be threatened. 
108. It is permissible for consent decrees to deprive majority employees of employment advan-
tages. The majority has a cause of action only if the decree violates the governing doctrine. See 
infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
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the making as correct, courts should hesitate to rely on the unlikelihood 
that the majority employee's interest will be infringed by the decree as a 
ground for finding that the majority employee has not met the interest 
requirement. In this context, courts should instead presume that the de-
cision will be wrong and find that the interest requirement is met. 109 
b. The Impair or Impede Requirement 
Under the second Rule 24(a) criterion, the applicant for intervention 
must show that resolution of questions of fact or law in the case may 
affect the applicant's position either legally or practically. Because of the 
collateral attack bar, the applicant may meet this impairment require-
ment, even though the resolution does not threaten to bind the applicant 
in a formal res judicata sense. 110 The case of the majority employees who 
will be barred from bringing an independent law suit thus should be 
easy-something equivalent to res judicata will bar these people. Clearly, 
if the interest itself qualifies, the majority employees' ability to protect 
that interest is impaired by a collateral attack bar. 
c. Inadequate Representation Requirement 
The third Rule 24(a) criterion requires the applicant for intervention 
to show that the applicant's interests are not represented adequately by 
those who already are party to the suit. The applicant need show only 
that "representation of his interest may be inadequate; and the burden of 
making that showing should be treated as minimal." 111 To demonstrate 
109. Such early intervention, moreover, need not force those already parties to litigate their 
entire case when all they want is to settle. The scope of the intervenor's interest should define the 
scope of his challenge. Thus, the successful intervenor can litigate the legality of the consent decree, 
but cannot force litigation of whether the plaintiff in the case should prevail in the cause of action. 
As will be explained, the issues in the plaintiff's case and the issues in the intervenor's case are two 
very different things. See infra note 219 and accompanying text. 
110. See United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1262 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Marino v. 
Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 301, 304 
(1988); Striffv. Mason, 849 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1988)); Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1325 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967)); Bolden v. Penn-
sylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 922 (3d Cir. 1978) (Garth, J ., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); Kramer, supra note 1, at 340; cf. United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511 (lith 
Cir. 1983) (denial of intervention because reverse discrimination suit available); FED. R. Civ. P. 24 
advisory committe notes to 1966 amends. Some courts have recognized an adequate impediment 
from the mere stare decisis effect of a court's resolution of a novel question of law. See United States 
v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1345 (lOth Cir. 1978); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. 
United States, 379 F.2d 818, 826 (5th Cir. 1967); cf Ionian Shipping Co. v. British Laws Ins. Co., 
426 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 1970). 
111. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.IO (1972); Foster, 655 F .2d at 1325 
(citing Trbovich, 404 U.S. 528; Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 911 
(D.C. Cir. 1977)). Courts disagree on who should bear the burden of showing adequacy or inade-
quacy of representation. See John E. Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 
24, 51 KY. L.J. 329, 353-54 (1969); Kramer, supra note 1, at 351 (citing 7 WRIGHT ET AL, supra 
note 64, § 1909, at 314-15 & nn.5-6 (citing cases)); 3B MooRE & KENNEDY, supra note 89, ~ 
24.07[4], at 24-72 to -73 & nn.9-ll. Some courts have suggested that, under the 1966 amendments 
to Rule 24, the burden is on the party opposing intervention to show that representation is adequate 
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inadequacy of representation, the applicant need show merely that the 
applicant's interests differ from those of the parties. 112 Even minor dif-
ferences between the applicant's interest and the putative representatives' 
interest are adequate to support intervention under Rule 24. Thus, if the 
petitioner can show that the employer does not represent its "distinct 
viewpoint," the petitioner should prevail on this criterion. 113 
At the outset of an employment discrimination institutional reform 
case, the majority employees' interests are likely to be identical to the 
defendant/employer's interests: both want to show that the challenged 
act is lawful and that affirmative action is therefore inappropriate. 114 If 
negotiations toward settlement between the employer and the minority 
employees are promising, however, the employer's interest frequently 
shifts from an interest in defeating the minority employees' claim to a 
superseding interest in settling the immediate case and minimizing finan-
cial liability. 115 When an employer agrees to undertake affirmative ac-
tion in exchange for dismissal of the suit, the employer, in essence, is 
willing to assume-for the sake of argument-that it has discrimi-
nated. 116 The majority employee, by contrast, always remains interested 
in demonstrating that no discrimination has occurred in order to show 
that affirmative action is unwarranted. Once it is shown that the em-
ployer is interested in settling, the discrepancy between the majority in-
terest and the employer's interest generally should pass muster on this 
requirement of Rule 24.1 17 
in cases where the petitioner has succeeded in demonstrating interest and impairment. See Smuck v. 
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967); cf. Bolden 
v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1978); 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 64, 
§ 1909, at 521. Some courts require a greater showing of inadequate representation when the gov-
ernment is a party because the government is presumed to represent the public interest. See United 
States v. Hooker Chern. & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984); Commonwealth v. Rizzo, 530 F .2d 
SOl, 505 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1976); Illinois v. Bristol-Myers Co., 470 F.2d 1276 
(D.C. Cir. 1972). This presumption may be rebutted by showing that the petitioner presently has an 
interest adverse to the government's. Bolden, 578 F.2d at 923 (Garth, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). If the court denies a majority employee intervention because the employee's 
interests are "adequately represented" by parties, the representation provided by present parties 
must be sufficient to bind the absentee under the Due Process Clause. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 
350 (citing 3B MOORE & KENNEDY, supra note 89, ~ 24.07[4], at 24-68); 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 64, § 1909, at 313. 
112. Foster, 655 F.2d at 1325. 
113. Johnson v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 500 F.2d 349, 354 (9th Cir. 1974). 
114. The statement in text assumes that the parties go into the case expecting to have to litigate. 
In fact, parties to the suit sometimes negotiate the settlement before the suit begins and file a com-
plaint together with a proposed consent decree that the court may approve immediately. Schwarz-
schild, supra note 1, at 913. 
11 S. The time for measuring adequacy of representation in decree negotiations is the time when 
the employee files the petition for intervention. Bolden, 578 F.2d at 924 (Garth, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
116. /d. at 923 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 
F.2d 175, 181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
117. See Bolden, 578 F.2d at 923 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Kramer, 
supra note 1, at 352. Absentees who have been adequately represented at the consent decree negotia-
tion stage may succeed in showing that their "representative" presently does not represent their 
interests in modifying a consent decree. Cf United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 395 (1977). 
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There may be concern that delaying the inadequacy determination 
until the employer undertakes settlement negotiations will render the in-
tervention too late to be timely under the fourth Rule 24 criterion. In 
fact, as discussed below, the timeliness requirement imposes upon the 
petitioner an obligation to seek intervention only when it becomes evi-
dent that available representation is inadequate. Thus, if it is the com-
mencement of settlement negotiations that terminates adequacy of 
representation, the majority employees' waiting for settlement negotia-
tions to commence should not render the petition to intervene 
untimely. 118 
Some argue that the employer's interests are actually at odds with 
the majority employees' interests from the beginning because the em-
ployer, from the beginning, has "different cost-benefit settlement inter-
ests, and incentives, from those of the [majority employees]."119 Courts 
thus might consider differences between the absentee's interest and the 
employer's potential interest in settling. 120 Acting on the assumption 
that the employer ultimately will desire to settle would be reasonable 
inasmuch as most Title VII cases are resolved through settlement. 121 
Nevertheless, recognizing inadequacy of representation based solely on 
potential for the employer's settlement interests would result in a finding 
that majority employees are inadequately represented in every minority 
suit seeking affirmative action. Prior to initiation of settlement talks, 
there would be no way to distinguish cases in which the interests of the 
majority would ultimately be adequately represented at trial. Thus, if 
mere potential for settlement rendered the employer's representation in-
adequate, majority employees either would unnecessarily intervene or, if 
they waited to see whether settlement became likely' might be deemed to 
have petitioned for intervention too late. As a rule, then, courts should 
deem representation inadequate only upon commencement of settlement 
negotiations. 122 
118. See United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1263 (7th Cir. 1989). 
119. United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1983). It has been sug-
gested that any time two parties have the power to settle their law suit at the expense of a third party, 
the representation is per se inadequate. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 352. 
120. See Jefferson County, 120 F.2d at 1516. 
121. Schwarzschild, supra note l, at 893-94; see also EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 521 F. Supp. 
263 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
122. The goals of Title VII and Rule 24 can best be effectuated if courts aim to achieve majority 
employee intervention immediately preceding or shortly after entry of the decree. If a majority 
employee cannot reasonably understand the decree's ramifications until after its implementation, 
then postimplementation intervention must be permitted as timely. See City of Chicago, 810 F.2d at 
1263. Courts should construe the timeliness requirement accordingly. The danger with employees 
making earlier predictions about whether their interests are at stake is that the employees may come 
to an incorrect conclusion and intervene unnecessarily. One court has suggested, moreover, that 
intervention shortly after initiation of the suit to defend an unlawful employment practice that bene-
fits the majority is improper. /d. If majority employees intervene early as a protective measure, they 
later may find that the defendant prevails at trial and they are unharmed, or that the ultimate con-
sent decree would have had no impact on their interests even if they had not intervened, and that 
they have wasted time, money, and judicial resources. Cf McDonald v. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065 
(5th Cir. 1970). Similarly, if the court denies such an early petition for intervention, "purposeless 
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d. The Timeliness Requirement 
Timeliness is perhaps the most difficult of the Rule 24 requirements 
to apply in these cases; it is also the requirement on which majority em-
ployees' applications for intervention most often flounder. 123 As articu-
lated by one court, "the purpose of the requirement is to prevent a tardy 
intervenor from derailing a lawsuit within sight of the terminal. " 124 
Whether a petition to intervene is timely is a question committed to judi-
cial discretion. 125 Courts have developed crit~ria to guide the exercise of 
that discretion, and the process of deciding the petition involves a balanc-
ing of these criteria: 126 "Whether a motion to intervene is timely made is 
'~o be determined from all the circumstances, including the purpose for 
which intervention is sought . . . and the improbability of prejudice to 
those already in the case.' " 127 
A petition is timely if it is made soon enough after the petitioner 
learns of his interest, and "soon enough" is measured by comparing any 
prejudice to the parties that the delay causes against prejudice inuring to 
the petitioner if he is excluded from the suit, in light of any special cir-
cumstances. In Stallworth v. Monsanto, 128 the Fifth Circuit reduced the 
timeliness analysis to four factors: 
(1) the length of delay between when petitioner learned or should 
have learned of his interest in the suit and when he petitioned to 
intervene; 
appeals" may result. Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 1977). Conversely, 
majority employees may be unable to appreciate the significance of the suit at an early date, and the 
court should not deny intervention once the terms of the decree become evident. Moreover, an early 
intervention petition based on projections about what relief will result from a suit may fail simply 
because the tenuous information available to majority employees at this early date does not permit 
the employees to show that they risk impairment of a .. significantly protectable interest." Donald-
son v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971). Negotiations may not have reached an advanced 
enough stage to permit protectable interests to be articulated. It is thus important that the timeliness 
clock not to begin ticking until the threat to the intervenors' interest is somewhat concrete. 
123. See Schwarzschild, supra note l, at 920. A court may encourage early intervention by 
having the plaintiffs specify whether they will seek classwide injunctive relief, and then may formu-
late notice to nonparty majority employees that includes notice of the probable impact on various 
nonparties. See Strickler, supra note 38, at 159().91. Because the petitioner stands to lose more 
when intervention would be of right, rather than permissive, courts should be reluctant to deny 
intervention as of right on timeliness grounds. McDonald, 430 F.2d at 1073. 
124. United States v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 710 F.2d 394, 396 (7th Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984). Exactly what constitutes the .. terminal" when a court enters a 
consent decree is open to question. Once the decree is entered, the court may retain jurisdiction 
indefinitely over the decree to hear disputes about the decree. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 
106, 114 (1932). 
125. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365-66 (1973); United States v. Jefferson County, 720 
F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1983); Howse v. SIV .. Canada Goose I," 641 F .2d 317, 320 (5th Cir . 
. 1981); Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 263; McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 
1977). 
126. See McDonald, 430 F .2d at 1071-74. 
127. Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing Hodgson v. United Mine Work-
ers, 473 F.2d 118, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1972))); see also NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. at 365-66. 
128. 558 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1977). Courts from a variety of circuits have subsequently relied 
upon the Stallworth analysis. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 341 & n.87. 
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(2) the extent of prejudice resulting to the existing parties caused by 
petitioner's delay; 
(3) the prejudice that would accrue to the petitioner if his petition 
were denied; and 
( 4) the existence of any unusual circumstances militating either for 
or against a conclusion that the application is timely. 129 
The first of the Stallworth factors focuses on "[t]he length of time 
during which the would-be intervenor actually knew or reasonably 
should have known of [his] interest in the case before [he] petitioned for 
leave to intervene."130 The Stallworth court cautioned that absolute 
measures of timeliness, such as the amount of time that may have elapsed 
since initiation of the action, should not be dispositive.131 Rather than 
calculating the time expired since the filing of the complaint, the task for 
the judge deciding whether to permit majority employee intervention is 
to determine when the majority employees should have realized that the 
suit would jeopardize their ability to protect their interests. As stated 
above, courts generally agree that no duty to intervene arises until the 
intervenor knows or should know that his interests may be affected by 
the suit. 132 The answer to the question of when the intervenor "should 
know" that his interests are threatened depends largely on who the 
129. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 264-66; see United States v. City of Chicago, 798 F.2d 969,975 (7th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1041 (1988). 
130. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 264. If the petitioner has known of his interest all along, but has 
understood his interests to have been adequately represented, then the time is measured from the 
time at which the petitioner learns the representation is inadequate. United Air Lines Inc. v. Mc-
Donald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). If the petitioner never had actual knowledge of the suit, courts may 
shift the burden to prove that intervention should be denied to the party opposing intervention. See 
McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1977). 
131. Although the Supreme Court's decision in NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973), 
relies upon knowledge of the suit's pendency to calculate untimeliness, the Stallworth court rejected 
arguments that such reliance means that learning of the lawsuit should start the clock for purposes 
of determining whether the applicant acted promptly. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 264. The Stallworth 
court rejected such a construction for three reasons: (1) in the NAACP case, circumstances were 
such that notice of the suit was the equivalent of notice that the applicant's interests were involved, 
so the court had no occasion to address the question of whether knowledge of the suit alone would 
have been enough; (2) in the more recent Supreme Court case of United Air Lines v. McDonald, 432 
U.S. 385 (1977), the Court had gauged timeliness from the date when the applicant learned its 
interests were no longer adequately represented; and (3) a rule making knowledge of the suit's pen-
dency the trigger would result in applications from people without a need to intervene and a bar of 
applicants with a need to intervene whose need was unrecognized when interventions would have 
been timely. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 264-65. Judge Garth took a similar stance in his dissenting 
opinion in Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 926 (3d Cir. 1978) (measuring timeli-
ness of petition from date on which events occurred that gave rise to applicants' claims for relief). 
Subsequent cases have followed suit. In United States v. South Bend Community School Corp., 710 
F .2d 394, 396 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984), for example, the Seventh Circuit 
specified that petitioner for intervention "must move promptly to intervene" as soon as he "knows or 
has reason to know that [his] interests might be adversely affected by the outcome of the litigation." 
/d. at 396; see also Kramer, supra note 1, at 341 & n.87. But see United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 
1285, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1980). This rule is consistent with the rule that statutory periods for cutting 
off the right to bring a claim may not be permitted to run before the plaintiff should know of this 
claim. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 341 n.86 (citing Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902)). 
132. To require intervention at any stage when the intervenor neither knows nor reasonably 
should know might violate due process. Cf Kramer, supra note 1, at 344 & n.98. How much time 
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would-be intervenor is. 133 
The Stallworth court refused to require the particular intervenors in 
that case to "fathomO the potential impact of [an] admittedly complex 
case on their seniority rights'' prior to the date on which the applicants 
actually knew for a fact that their contractual rights were in jeopardy, 
that is, when the consent decree actually was entered.134 In Culbreath v. 
Dukakis, 135 by contrast, the court required that would-be intervenors act 
shortly after they gained knowledge of the suit itself. 136 In the view of 
the Culbreath court, the complaint and the front-page newspaper reports 
indicating that the plaintiff was seeking an affirmative action remedy 
were adequate to apprise the applicants that affirmative action measures 
would result in nonminorities' being passed over in favor of minorities. 137 
The major difference between Stallworth and Culbreath was in how 
the courts viewed the petitioners for intervention. The Culbreath court 
deemed the notice of the suit to be adequate notice of potential harm 
because the intervenors in Culbreath were sophisticated unions capable 
of translating newspaper accounts, and the relief sought in the complaint, 
into threats to their interests. 138 Therefore, the court was willing to im-
pute knowledge of the union's interest in the suits from knowledge of the 
suits themselves. In Stallworth, by contrast, because the would-be inter-
venors were the individual employees themselves, and thus presumably 
less sophisticated than the unions in Culbreath, the court looked to the 
date when the intervenors subjectively understood the suit's threat to 
their interest. Other courts agree that simple knowledge of the suit does 
not necessarily trigger the time, absent some reason such as that in Cul-
breath, to impute knowledge that the intervenor's interests may be 
affected. 139 
the court permits to elapse between the intervenor's learning he should intervene and the petition for 
intervention depends on the circumstances of each case. /d. at 344-45. 
133. The court has several possible choices on when the would-be intervenor "should know" his 
interests are threatened: 
(1) when the law suit commences or the intervenor has notice of the suit; 
(2) when the decree is entered or the intervenor has notice of the decree; or 
(3) when action is taken pursuant to the decree which harms the intervenor. 
Once the intervenor should know of the threat to his interest, courts allow a reasonable time for the 
intervenor to investigate the facts and law and to prepare a petition for intervention. See United 
States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1263 (7th Cir. 1989) (six weeks not excessive delay). 
134. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 267; see Corley v. Jackson Police Dep't, 755 F.2d 1207, 1210 (5th 
Cir. 1985). 
135. 630 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980). 
136. /d. at 21. 
137. The Culbreath court, moreover, found that knowledge that the petitioner had a legal inter-
est in the suit would suffice to establish the date of knowledge, even though subsequently (too late) 
the petitioner developed a much greater interest. /d. at 21. 
138. /d. 
139. Jones v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 735 F.2d 923, 934 & n.l4 (5th Cir. 1984); Stallworth, 558 
F.2d at 267; id. at 946 (Rubin, J., dissenting). But see Schultz v. Connery, 863 F.2d 551, 553-55 (7th 
Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 675 F.2d 164, 166 (8th Cir. 1982). In United Air-
lines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the time for intervening 
should be deemed to commence only when the petitioner realizes that a party to the suit is no longer 
representing the petitioner's interests. /d. at 395. This decision confirms a pragmatic, reasonable 
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Questions of timeliness are complicated when the absentee has not 
even applied yet for a position with the defendant or otherwise could not 
possibly know even with notice of the decree that his interests will be 
affected. 140 Courts in these circumstances should remain faithful to the 
rule that an intervenor cannot be expected to petition for intervention 
prior to actual or imputed knowledge of the threat. For people who are 
not employees or applicants at the time the decree is entered, and whose 
interests were not represented, petitions to intervene should be deemed 
timely if filed when the petitioners learn of the decree's effects on them, 
although that may be long after entry of the decree.141 
Ascertaining the time at which the petitioner should be deemed to 
know of the threat to his interests is only the beginning of the analysis 
under Stallworth's first criterion, because this criterion requires the court 
to look at the length of delay between when the petitioner knows of the 
threat to his interest and when the petitioner seeks intervention. Once 
the court determines when the petitioner had knowledge, however, it is 
only by looking at the second Stallworth criterion that the court can as-
sess the significance of any delay between knowledge and filing of the 
petition. Whether the delay is two weeks or two years, a delay is too long 
only if it causes prejudice to those who already are parties to the 
decree. 142 
Courts differ about what sort of prejudice qualifies under this crite-
rion. According to Stallworth, the court should measure only that preju-
dice resulting from the applicant's delay, not prejudice that would result 
from the very fact of intervention regardless of timing. 143 The Culbreath 
court, by contrast, modified Stallworth and required that prejudice to the 
parties caused by the intervention itself, rather than by the delay, should 
person approach to the question of when the responsibility to intervene begins. See also Bolden v. 
Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1978) (timeliness of application for interven-
tion determined by reference to time elapsed since conflict arose between petitioner's and representa-
tive's interests); Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 289, 294-95 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In 
NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973), the Supreme Court found untimeliness because it 
should have been evident to the would-be intervenors that the parties were about to settle the case to 
the intervenors' detriment. ld. at 367; see also Caddo, 735 F.2d 923. 
If timeliness is gauged from the time the petitioner knows of the suit, rather than when he 
knows his interests may be impaired, the effect of this requirement would be that the petitioner for 
intervention would have to file his petition before he could qualify under the other Rule 24 criteria, 
and thus lose the opportunity to intervene at all. As stated earlier, the interests of the majority 
employees are likely to become visibly adverse to the interests of their employer only when the 
employer is eyeing settlement possibilities. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. Thus the 
petitioner may be incapable of showing that his interests are inadequately represented at the time 
when he first learns of the suit. Such early petitions for intervention may meet with the further 
challenge that the petitioner lacks standing to raise a claim so speculative. 
140. Under sec. 108, such unknown future applicants are not barred unless their interests are 
adequately represented. An expansive construction of Rule 24 will help to assure that their interests 
are, in fact, protected, and that postdecree intervention by such absentees will not become necessary. 
141. If courts insist on deeming untimely petitions to intervene filed after entry of the decree, 
such petitioners cannot be said to have had a reasonable opportunity to be heard under sec. 108. 
142. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 265; Nevilles v. EEOC, 511 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1975). 
143. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 265. 
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be measured under this factor. 144 The Culbreath court acknowledged 
that the delay in intervention in that case had caused no prejudice. 14s 
The court instead looked at whether the intervention itself caused the 
parties any prejudice. The Culbreath court identified as "prejudice" the 
fact that the unions were "likely to oppose the goal provisions of the 
consent decree," opposition which might have the effect of delaying or 
denying the relief to which the parties had agreed. 146 The Culbreath 
"any prejudice" doctrine thus would have significant implications for 
those who seek intervention in employment discrimination consent de-
cree cases: under the Culbreath view, the desire of any majority em-
ployee to challenge the consent decree would qualify as "prejudice" to 
the parties. The Culbreath prejudice analysis would preclude interven-
tion in every consent decree case. If it properly may be assumed that 
intervention should occur in at least some consent decree cases, then Cul-
breath provides no guidance on when. "Prejudice," then, should be mea-
sured according to the Stallworth rule that only prejudice resulting from 
the delay is relevant. 
Although absolute measures of timeliness should not be dispositive 
of the timeliness issue, courts seem to treat entry of the judgment in the 
case as a demarcation for purposes of prejudice: cases suggest that those 
petitions for intervention filed before judgment are more likely to be 
granted than those filed after judgment. 147 The rationale for the demar-
cation is that if intervention is sought before the decree, then prej1,1dice to 
existing parties is less likely to result from the delay because the existing 
parties will not have invested time and energy in negotiating and imple-
menting the decree. 148 Some courts view "[i]ntervention after entry of a 
144. Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 21-22 (lst Cir. 1980). 
145. The Culbreath opinion states: 
We see little prejudice to the parties caused by the failure of the unions to intervene more 
promptly. In fact, we note that, had any such prejudice been apparent, it could have been 
remedied by joinder of the unions. We do, however, perceive real prejudice to the parties if the 
unions are allowed to intervene. 
/d. at 22 (citation omitted). 
The Culbreath court thus apparently took the Stallworth party-prejudice from delay factor to 
mean that the court should look at whether the intervenors' absence from the case in the past had 
been prejudicial to the parties, rather than whether the staleness of the intervenors' Claim would 
prejudice the parties. 
146. Admittedly there is also language in Culbreath about the "delayed intervention of the un-
ions [having caused] several ofthe target dates in the consent decree [to be] nullified," but the court 
does not distinguish the issue of what difference it made prejudice-wise that the intervenors peti-
tioned so late in the game and what prejudice was caused by the mere fact of intervention, regardless 
of its timing. /d. at 22. · 
147. See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 64, § 1916, at 444; cf. McClain v. Wagner Elec. Co., 
SSO F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1976); McDonald & E.J. Lavino, Co., 430 F .2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1970). The 
Supreme Court has upheld postjudgment intervention in appropriate cases. United Airlines Inc. v. 
McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977); see also Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 267. 
148. Note, however, that the court can enter the decree over the intervenor's objections, and the 
intervenor can then keep the suit alive to contest the legality of the decree. Firefighters v. City of 
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986). The other parties at least will be forewarned of this possibility 
though. According to the court in Jones v. Caddo Parish School Board, the particular prejudice 
following entry of a consent decree may be that "positions have hardened, concessions here have 
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consent decree [as] reserved for exceptional cases."149 Thus, if the par-
ties have completed extensive discovery, and the petitioner's untimely en-
try into the suit would force revisitation of many of the discovery issues, 
prejudice would weigh against granting the petition. 150 While such a de-
marcation may hold sway in some circumstances, it is especially inappro-
priate in the consent decree context. Strict implementation of such a cut-
off would increase the number of majority employees not represented in 
the earlier suit, and thus increase the number of collateral challenges. To 
the extent that a judgment day cut-off is based on a desire not to waste 
the judicial and parties' resources expended in reaching the judgment, 
that basis is less fitting in the present context because majority employees 
not represented or permitted to intervene may bring entirely separate 
suits. · 
The third Stallworth timeliness factor also concerns prejudice. Here 
the inquiry pertains not to prejudice to the parties, but rather to the 
amount of prejudice that the would-be intervenor may suffer if the court 
denies his petition for leave to intervene. The threat to the would-be 
intervenor of being permanently foreclosed from bringing a later chal-
lenge to the consent decree should qualify as such prejudice. 151 Barring 
unusual circumstances militating against intervention, this prejudice to 
the would-be intervenor who may be collaterally estopped seemingly 
should outweigh all other considerations. Nevertheless, courts may 
sometimes take a contrary position. In Culbreath, the court acknowl-
edged that unavailability of the opportunity for collateral attack placed 
the applicants in the difficult position of having no opportunity to chal-
lenge the decree. 152 The Culbreath court discounted this prejudice, how-
ever, because it believed that the would-be intervenors would have had 
only a very weak chance of prevailing in a subsequent attack, had one 
been traded for those there, persons, groups, and institutions have gone on the line publicly, and 
months of effort and mobilization of community and citizen involvement have been expended." 
Jones v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 735 F.2d 923, 935 (5th Cir. 1984). In Caddo, the court noted that 
permitting the intervenors into the case after entry of the consent decree would render "all the time, 
effort and meetings" wasted. /d. 
149. Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 837 (1978) (quoted in Caddo, 735 F.2d at 935). 
150. Commonwealth v. Rizzo, 530 F .2d 501 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1975). In such 
cases, leave to intervene may be made subject to the intervenor's accepting discovery that has taken 
place. Boldon v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 927 (3d Cir. 1978) (Garth, J. , concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
151. See Caddo, 735 F.2d at 936-37; Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 
McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1970); cf. United States v. Jefferson County, 
720 F.2d 1511, 1519 (lith Cir. 1983); United States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 
1975). See Schwarzschild, supra note I, at 922. 
152. Surprisingly, the court added that "[i]ntervention to modify the decree, the proper proce-
dural recourse under the circumstances, [would] be barred by the doctrine of res judicata." Cul-
breath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 22-23 (lst Cir. 1980) (citing O'Burn v. Shapp, 70 F.R.D. 549 (E.D. 
Pa.), aff'd, 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 968 (1977)); Construction Indus. 
Combined Comm. v. Operating Eng'rs, Local 513, 67 F.R.D. 664, 666 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (interven-
tion would be the proper recourse). 
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been permitted. 153 This was because the court viewed the entry of a con-
sent decree as a determination by the court that the plaintiff was likely to 
succeed on the merits. The plaintiff's probability of success, of course, 
demonstrated the defendant's and intervenor's probability of failure in a 
subsequent challenge, if one had been available. 154 
What the Culbreath court suggests, then, is that refusing to permit 
majority employees to intervene does not prejudice these employees be-
. cause the court probably made a good decision to enter the decree, and 
thus any challenge to that decision would have failed anyway. This sug-
gestion seems to mean that any time a consent decree is or will be en-
tered, the intervenors cannot satisfy the prejudice prong. If we may 
properly assume that there are some consent decree cases in which inter-
vention by majority employees is appropriate, then the Culbreath deci-
sion cannot help us distinguish between those who should intervene and 
those who should not. 155 
The fourth Stallworth factor questions whether any unusual circum-
stances militate either for or against a determination that the application 
is timely. 156 Such factors may be that the would-be intervenor was un-
able to intervene earlier or, as in Stallworth, that the district court re-
fused to permit the employer to give notice to its white employees of the 
potential import of the suit. 1 57 There are two unusual circumstances in 
consent decree cases, both pointing to timeliness. One is the peculiar 
circumstances of the majority employees who seek admittance to the suit. 
153. Culbreath, 630 F.2d at 23. 
154. /d. The Culbreath court measured prejudice to the unions from denial of intervention "to 
be as slight as the unions' probability of success on the merits of the issues they would raise upon 
intervention." /d. The court derived its authority to gauge the union's probability of success on the 
merits on the court's "extensive exposure to the Massachusetts civil service system," rather than on 
evidence in the case. /d. This exposure led the court to conclude that the unions had little chance of 
success on the merits of their complaints and that, therefore, the prejudice to the union would be 
slight if the court did not permit them to intervene. In his concurring opinion in Culbreath, Senior 
Circuit Judge Aldrich took issue with the majority's passing on the merits of the unions' case when 
the unions had yet to receive an opportunity to present their case. /d. at 25. 
It is interesting to note in this connection that most employers who settle via consent decree 
specify in the decree that they admit no liability. Schwarzschild, supra note 1, at 895 (citing United 
States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, Ill (1931); EEOC v. AT&T, 556 F.2d 167, 176 (3d Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978)). 
155. Whereas Stallworth suggests that leniency should be given when courts are considering 
prejudice to the would·be intervenor seeking intervention as of right, Culbreath affords no leniency. 
Each circuit has company in these views. Cases following Stallworth include: Sanguine, Ltd. v. 
United States Dep't of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416 (lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987); 
Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 710 F .2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1983). Cases following Culbreath include: Garrity v. 
Gallen, 697 F.2d 452 (lst Cir. 1983); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141 (1st Cir. 1982). 
See Jones v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 704 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 675 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1982). 
156. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 266. The Stallworth court found it unnecessary to consider this 
factor because the other three factors pointed to intervention. /d. at 267. 
157. /d. at 266. The Culbreath court found unusual circumstances militating against interven-
tion in the fact that the affirmative action at issue did not violate certain collective bargaining agree-
ments. Culbreath, 630 F.2d at 24. Courts may also consider as a factor militating in favor of 
intervention the fact that no party to the decree represented the would-be intervenor's interests. 
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The other is the availability of limited purpose intervention and the pro-
tection such intervention affords those already party to the suit. 
The peculiar circumstances of majority employees seeking interven-
tion in the minority suit may count as "an unusual circumstance militat-
ing in favor of a determination that the application is timely." 158 The 
collateral attack bar should weigh in favor of a timeliness finding because 
a finding of untimeliness would have the extreme consequence of perma-
nently barring intervention. This position finds support in the Supreme 
Court's NAACP v. New York 159 opinion. In denying intervention in that 
case, the Supreme Court relied upon the unusual circumstance that the 
would-lie intervenors would not be foreclosed from direct and collateral 
challenges of the redistricting plans that concerned the would-be inter-
venors.160 If availability of collateral challenge weighed against timeli-
ness in NAACP, then presumably unavailability of such a challenge 
should weigh in favor of a finding of timeliness. On the other hand, the 
potential need to avoid multitudinous collateral challenges to consent de-
crees if intervention is denied may cause courts to find the circumstances 
counsel in favor of intervention in the instant suit. Because section 108 
forecloses suits only by those whose interests have been adequately repre-
sented, 161 the court may find that permitting intervention in the minority 
suit is by far the most efficient way to proceed for those whose interests 
are not represented. 
The court also may consider the fact that the would-be intervenor 
seeks "limited purpose" intervention as an unusual circumstance militat-
ing in favor of intervention.162 "Limited purpose" intervention means 
that the intervenor will not force the other parties to relitigate their entire 
case or unnecessarily litigate portions of the case that have been settled. 
As is discussed below, this is an appropriate option for the majority em-
ployee who intervenes in the minority employees' suit. 
Not only do the standards of Rule 24, strictly applied, dictate that 
courts generally should permit majority employee intervention in these 
employment discrimination cases, but the policies underlying the rule 
158. As suggested above, courts may deem the niere opportunity to seek intervention to be an 
adequate "opportunity to be heard" for purposes of sec. 108. 
159. 413 u.s. 345 (1973). 
160. /d. at 368. The Court also found that a grant of intervention in that case would have 
"seriously disrupt[ed] the State's electoral process." /d. at 369. Courts should not consider here the 
disruption that invariably occurs as a result of intervention in a consent decree suit. Such disruption 
has already been considered as a form of prejudice resulting from the applicant's delay in interven-
ing. See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text. 
161. Section 108 defines the class of adequately represented people as persons "whose interests 
were adequately represented by another person who had previously challenged the judgment or or-
der on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual situation, unless there has been an interven-
ing change in law or fact." Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076 (Nov. 21, 1991) 
(amending Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(n)(1)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h (1988)). 
162. Jones v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 735 F.2d 923, 938 (5th Cir. 1984); cf. Kirkland v. New 
York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 
(1984). 
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also support intervention. A major purpose of Rule 24 is "to protect 
non-parties from having their interests adversely affected by litigation 
conducted without their participation."163 Permitting intervention will 
assure due process and will avoid unfairness in the event the section 108 
collateral bar is construed to apply to majority employees who have had 
an opportunity to petition for intervention, but whose petitions have been 
denied. Courts must construe the intervention rule carefully and consist-
ently with the liberal joinder policies underlying it to ensure fairness to 
. the parties and to majority employees seeking intervention. 164 In short, 
courts should encourage joinder by intervention. By contrast, courts 
should view joinder under Rule 19 less favorably m these 
circumstances. 165 
2. Joinder of Necessary and Indispensable Parties 
a. . What Rule 19 Is 
Unlike intervention, which is a mechanism for absentees to interject 
themselves into a suit, Rule 19 permits a party to the ·suit (usually the 
defendant) to force joinder of someone the plaintiff initially elected not to 
sue. Suppose that a group of majority employees receives notice of a 
discrimination suit that seeks affirmative action, but chooses not to inter-
vene. The defendant in the suit, concerned that any settlement of the suit 
may ultimately meet with opposition from these absent employees, brings 
the problem of their absence to the court's attention. To raise this issue, 
the defendant must invoke Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, governing joinder of necessary and indispensable parties. 166 
163. Caddo, 735 F.2d at 935. Although the timing of intervention may cause the court some 
inconvenience, "mere inconvenience is not in itself a sufficient reason to reject as untimely a motion 
to intervene as of right." McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir. 1970). 
164. The same factors that point to intervention of right under Rule 24(a) would argue for 
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) in the event that the court finds that petitioners for inter-
vention have not met the Rule 24(a) requirements. In fact, in most of the employment discrimina-
tion cases at issue, whether the majority employees gained admittance to the suit via Rule 24(a) (of 
right) or Rule 24(b) (permissive) would not matter. One distinction between the two parts of the 
rule is that intervenors of right under part (a) of the rule may acquire the federal court's ancillary 
subject matter jurisdiction over their claims, whereas permissive intervenors' claims must have an 
independent basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ET AL, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1923 (1986); see also Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 
104 Stat. 5089 (Dec. 1, 1990) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367). Because this article envisions 
petitioners for intervention whose claims arise under Title VII, the federal court has jurisdiction over 
the claim without resort to principles of ancillary jurisdiction. An additional difference between 
intervention of right and permissive intervention is that an order denying the former is appealable 
and an order denying the latter is not. See also JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 62, § 10.17, at 553 
n.22. 
165. "[O]nly the absent parties can accurately measure the ... interests that they now hold and 
the extent to which [those interests] could be impaired." National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. 
Supp. 271, 275 (D.D.C. 1985). 
166. FED. R. Crv. P. 19. Unlike most of the federal joinder rules, which permit the plaintiff to 
elect whether or not to join new parties, Rule 19 empowers the defendant to compel joinder of a 
party. Rule 19 is sometimes used by defendants who legitimately believe that someone needed for 
the lawsuit is missing and should be joined before things go any further. Rule 19 is also frequently 
used by defendants who hope to have the case dismissed by convincing the court that a nonparty 
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b. How Rule 19 Works 
The application of Rule 19 requires a two-step process. 167 In the 
first step, the court must determine whether the absentee is a person 
needed for just adjudication of the action, thus "necessary, under the 
standards of Rule 19(a). 168 If the absentee is necessary, the court must 
order the plaintiff to join the absentee in the lawsuit.169 The second step 
of the process is triggered if joinder of this "necessary" absentee is impos-
sible. Such impossibility may result from rules of venue and personal or 
subject matter jurisdiction. 170 In this second step, the court must deter-
mine whether the case should go forward despite the unfeasibility of join-
ing the necessary absentee. If the absentee is so essential to the suit that 
the suit should not, "in equity and good conscience," proceed in his ab-
sence, the absentee is deemed "indispensable," and the court must dis-
miss the suit. 171 If the absentee is not so crucial to the suit, he is deemed 
merely necessary, but not indispensable, and the suit may proceed with-
out him!72 
c. Rule 19(a): Majority Employees As Necessary Parties 
Under Rule 19(a), an absentee is necessary if he has an interest relat-
ing to the subject matter of the suit and if either ( 1) the disposition of the 
who cannot be joined is crucial to the suit. If the defendant fails to invoke Rule 19 where appropri-
ate, the rule requires the court to apply the rule sua sponte. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust v. 
Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111 (1968). 
167. Takeda v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1985); Pasco lnt'l 
(London) Ltd. v. Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1980); LeBeau v. Libby-Owens-
Ford Co., 484 F.2d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 1973); Freeman v. Liu, 112 F.R.D. 35, 40 (N.D. Ill. 1986); 
Bedel v. Thompson, 103 F.R.D. 78, 80 (S.D. Ohio 1984). 
168. 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 164, § 1611, at 161. 
169. If the absentee is someone who should be a third-party defendant, thus joinable by the 
defendant under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, then a Rule 19 motion for joinder 
is, of course, unnecessary. The defendant may, however, move for Rule 19 dismissal of the suit 
because of the defendant's inability to join the third-party defendants. See infra note 171 and ac-
companying text. 
170. Macklin v. Butler, 553 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1977). The Rule contemplates that joinder 
of the nonparty will be impossible (1) where the nonparty's joinder would destroy subject matter 
jurisdiction; or (2) when the court cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over the nonparty; and (3) 
when the nonparty, once joined, objects to venue. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19(a). If a nonparty is not 
deemed "necessary" under section (a), then the court need never reach the Rule 19(b) issues pertain-
ing to "indispensability," that is, whether the action should go forward in the absence of an admit-
tedly necessary party who cannot be joined. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19. 
171. Prior to the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the term "indispen-
sable" meant, among other things, that the absentee's interests were not severable from those of one 
of the parties. Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1936) (quoting Shields v. 
Barrow, 58 U.S. 130, 139 (1854)). Such "wooden" decision making has given way to consideration 
of practical matters under the amended rule. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 164, § 1607, at 86. 
"The reference in revised Rule 19 to this conclusory label was not intended to codify the pre-1966 
body of precedent in which particular parties were categorized as 'indispensable.'" /d. at 85. "Ac-
cording to the present language of Rule 19(b) the court is to invoke this label only after an evaluation 
of the relevant considerations presented by the case, particularly those enumerated in the rule itself, 
makes it clear that in 'equity and good conscience' the action should not proceed in his absence." !d. 
172. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19(b). 
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suit may keep the absentee from being able to protect this interest;173 or 
(2) the defendant in the suit may be subjected to inconsistent obligations 
as a result of the absentee's attempts to protect the absentee's interest in a 
subsequent lawsuit.174 Given a collateral attack bar, majority employees 
typically are necessary parties by virtue of the first of these conditions; 
absent such a bar, they are necessary by virtue of the second. 175 
Under either of the Rule 19(a)(2) provisions, the first inquiry is the 
same as the first Rule 24 intervention inquiry-whether the absentee's 
interest is cognizable under the rule. 176 Like the would-be intervenors 
under Rule 24, the majority employees who are considered for Rule 19 
joinder in employment discrimination cases have an interest in not being 
victims of "reverse" discrimination. 177 Also as with Rule 24, some 
courts incorporate into the interest requirement a requirement that the 
interest be one that is truly threatened. Thus, some courts recognize a 
Rule 19 interest only when a subsequent suit by the absentee to enforce 
the interest is likely to succeed. 178 Courts requiring likelihood of success 
173. FED. R. CIV. P. l9(a)(2)(i). 
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(2)(ii). One commentator has suggested that "a successful third-
party attack will necessarily result in conflicting injunctions, since the judgment in the second action 
will enjoin compliance with the consent decree." Kramer, supra note 1, at 333. In fact, a court may 
order relief in the second suit that is logically inconsistent with the consent decrees (back wages for 
example), but which does not actually require disobedience to the decree. It is unlikely that a court 
would grant relief literally requiring the employer to violate the terms of another court's order or its 
own order in an earlier case. 
A nonparty also may be necessary if his absence makes it impossible for those present to resolve 
their conflict completely. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19(a)(l). In fact, the first of the Rule 19(a) situations, in 
which the parties cannot resolve matters in the nonparty's absence, is not called into play at all by 
the type of employment discrimination lawsuit this article considers. This is because this portion of 
Rule 19(a) contemplates a situation in which somehow the defendant literally does not possess the 
means to give the plaintiff redress without the nonparty's participation. /d. 19 advisory committee 
comment to 1966 amends. Usually the employment discrimination defendant can pay over to the 
minority plaintiff appropriate relief, affirmative or otherwise, without the participation of the white 
employees. The whites' absence does not tie the hands of the employer or the strings on the em-
ployer's pocketbook. It is thus the second subparagraph of section (a) that governs the question of 
when majority employers must be deemed necessary in discrimination lawsuits. 
Although the rule states generally "a party to the suit," it protects only the defendant. The 
danger to the plaintiff of subsequent action by the absentee is not of concern here because the plain-
tiff, as the master of his suit, may unilaterally join any parties whose absence would prejudice him. 
Simply put, the plaintiff is in a position to sue whomever she wishes. It is the defendant who, 
involuntarily hailed into court, needs the protection of Rule 19. See, e.g. , Provident Tradesmens 
Bank & Trust v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 110 (1968). 
175. This generalization is offered to assist in the analysis of Rule 19 in the instant context, but 
with the caveat that the inquiry under Rule 19(a) is normally a practical inquiry based on the specific 
facts of each case. "Th[e] rule does not set forth a rigid or mechanical formula for decision." JTG 
of Nashville v. Rhythm Band, 693 F . Supp. 623, 625 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); see also Provident Trades-
mens Bank & Trust, 390 U.S. at 116 n.12. Rather, the rule was "designed to encourage courts to 
appraise themselves of the 'practical considerations' of each individual case in light of the policies 
underlying the rule." Rhythm Band, 693 F. Supp. at 625. In the specific language of another court, 
"the rule emphasizes practical consequences and its application depends on the circumstances of 
each case." Takeda v. Northwestern Nat'! Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d. 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1985). 
176. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
177. But see English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 465 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1972). 
178. One scholar has argued that "[i]t is impossible to imagine an affirmative action case in 
which other employees do not have a strong interest and an arguable legal theory. They should be 
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in the future suit have held that "[s]peculation about the occurrence of a 
future event ordinarily does not render all parties potentially affected by 
that future event necessary or indispensable parties under Rule 19." 179 
In the view of these courts, "it is clear that Rule 19(a) has never required 
joinder in every case in which 'interests' of white persons may be ad-
versely affected by a court decree terminating racially discriminatory 
practices."180 These courts suggest that a "substantial likelihood" of 
prejudice is required to justify Rule 19 joinder of absentees. 181 Other 
courts are more lenient. The more lenient courts that require less than a 
likelihood of prevailing in the subsequent suit have relied on the language 
of the rule, which speaks in terms of "possibilities."182 
As with Rule 24, courts should be reluctant to find that the interest 
requirement is not met on the sole ground that the court believes that its 
own decision should be upheld if the absentees challenge the decree in a 
subsequent suit. Because courts invariably hope that all their orders, if 
appealed, will be found to be lawful, a court's expectation that a subse-
quent challenge to its order would fail should not defeat the interest 
requirement. 
Instead, what should defeat the motion to join majority employees is 
joined in every case in which plaintiffs seek more than make-whole relief for identifiable victims." 
Laycock, supra note 21, at 124. 
179. Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1046 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 849 (1983); LeBeau v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 484 F.2d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 1973) ("too 
speculative to justify dismissal"). Even for those courts that permit uncertainty of success in the 
majority's future suit, however, those majority employees whose suits are barred by sec. 108, Cate-
gory 2 should be found not to have cognizable interests. This is because these people have, by 
definition, been adequately represented in the first suit; thus, they have already had their challenges 
raised and considered. 
180. English, 465 F .2d at 46. This was applied to joinder of male employees in Spirt v. Teachers 
Insurance & Annuity Association, 416 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a sex discrimination 
case. 
181. Coastal Modular Corp. , 635 F.2d at 1108. Rule 19(a) actually speaks in terms of practical 
impairment, rather than legal impairment. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). It might, therefore, be argued 
that even those majority employees who never would have a viable cause of action-because the 
decree was verifiably lawful-should be deemed interest-impaired. That is, the decree indeed will 
harm them, by taking job advantages away, but will do so only in a way consistent with governing 
precedent. Nevertheless, some courts require not only that the absentee have a future suit, but that 
the suit be likely to succeed. See supra note 179. 
182. In fact, the term "may" in Rule 19 refers to the possibility that the absentee's ability to 
protect his interest may be impaired, not to the question whether the interest at stake is threatened 
enough. Under Firefighters it no longer should be possible for the intervenor to force the other 
parties to adjudicate fully their own dispute. Under Firefighters, the intervenor has no power to 
block settlement by withholding his consent. A number of cases before Firefighters had reached a 
contrary result. See United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane); Cul-
breath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Simmonds Precision Prods., Inc., 
319 F. Supp. 620, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Kramer, supra note 1, at 353 n.l35 (citing Sanguine, Ltd. v. 
United States Dep't of Interior, 798 F.2d 389, 390-91 (lOth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 
( 1987)). In the words of one court, judges "need not conclusively determine how collateral estoppel 
would operate in future litigation. 'Rule 19 speaks to possible harm, not only to certain harm.' " 
Takeda v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 821 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Aguilar v. Los Angeles County, 751 F.2d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1985)). Several courts have 
used this language to support joinder of absentees based in part upon a "significant possibility" of 
prejudice. See Takeda, 765 F.2d at 821. 
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the Rule 19(a) impairment requirement. Once it is established that the 
absentee has a cognizable, adequately threatened interest in the suit, the 
defendant must further establish under the remaining portion of Rule 
19(a) either that the absentee's ability to protect that interest may be 
impaired by disposition of the suit or that the absentee is likely to bring a 
subsequent action that will subject the defendant to inconsistent obliga-
tions. It is these aspects of Rule 19(a) that will cause the failure of a Rule 
19 motion to join absent majority employees. 
(i) Rule 19(a)(2)(i) 
Rule 19(a)(2)(i) is virtually identical to Rule 24(a)(2). Both require 
joinder if the absentee claims an interest relating to the subject of the 
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence 
may "as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that 
interest."183 Unlike Rule 24 intervention, however, the goal of this por-
tion of Rule 19 is to obligate those present in the suit to protect the 
absentee. 184 
The leading case on the application of Rule 19, Provident Trades-
mens Bank & Trust v. Patterson, 185 suggests that the obligation of courts 
to use Rule 19 to protect against such prejudice is of due process dimen-
sions.186 As a lower court has stated, "(a] court must protect the inter-
183. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19(a)(2)(i). See supra note 176 and accompanying text. Prejudice to the 
nonparty and prejudice to the defendant may appear at first glance to amount to one and the same 
thing. That is, one may expect that if prejudice to the nonparty results from judgment in the suit, 
then the nonparty is likely to bring a suit against the defendant. That suit, in tum, may result in an 
inconsistent obligation being imposed upon the defendant; thus prejudicing the defendant. Prejudice 
to the nonparty· does not, however, equal prejudice to the defendant. The rule speaks, not of impair-
ment of the absentee's interest, but rather of impairment of his ability to protect his interest. FED. 
R. Ctv. P. 19(aX2)(i). The rule envisions and protects against a situation in which the nonparty will 
not be able to succeed in a subsequent suit to recover whatever that first suit irretrievably took from 
him. The nonparty envisioned by the rule thus poses no threat of inconsistent obligations to the 
defendant, for the rule protects the nonparty only if he cannot prevail in the second suit. Conversely, 
a nonparty who can succeed in imposing inconsistent obligations upon the defendant via a subse-
quent lawsuit (our concern in the prejudice to defendant prong of this provision) is not a nonparty 
whose ability to protect his own interest is impaired, inasmuch as he can succeed in the subsequent 
suit. 
184. Those nonparties whose interests arguably are affected are in a better position to know 
whether any potential effects of the decree are important enough to warrant filing suit. See House 
Hearings, supra note 86, at 464 (statement of Prof. Larry Kramer) (stressing that traditional route in 
Anglo-American litigation system is to leave burden of filing claim with nonparty). As one court has 
stated, "the interests of an unjoined party are especially vulnerable in that they are not vigorously 
asserted by counsel before the court. As a result, it is possible that the true nature and extent of 
those interests may not be explored until after they are irreparably prejudiced." Boles v. Greeneville 
Housing Auth., 468 F.2d 476, 478 n.3 (6th Cir. 1972). 
185. 390 u.s. 102 (1968). 
186. /d. at 123. The Provident Court stated: "Neither Rule 19, nor we, today, mean to fore-
close an examination in future cases to see whether an injustice is being, or might be, done to the 
substantive, or, for that matter, constitutional rights of an outsider by proceeding with a particular 
case." /d. 
The burdens of joining all "necessary" parties in these cases might be alleviated by joining 
several majority employees as representatives of a defendant class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, although use of this device may be so fraught with difficulties as to be unwork-
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ests of the parties not before it to avoid possible prejudicial effect; failure 
of a court to protect those interests by joinder may amount to a violation 
of due process."187 
Like Rule 24, Rule 19(a)(2)(i) does not, by its terms, require legal 
impairment of the interest, but only practical impairment. Some courts 
have emphasized that "it is not necessary, under Rule 19, that [the absen-
tee] would be bound by the judgment in a technical sense, but is enough 
that as a practical matter [his] rights will be affected."188 Nevertheless, 
other courts have relied on the fact that the absentee is not legally bound 
by a particular decision to support the conclusion that the absentee is not 
a necessary or indispensable party.189 Under either approach, courts 
would see an absolute collateral attack bar as impairment of the majority 
employees' ability to protect their interest. Such a bar, in effect, would 
render the absent majority employees bound by the decree, and this bind-
ing effect entirely eliminates the absentees' ability to protect their interest 
if they are not joined. The protections built into both categories of sec-
tion 108, however, suggest that courts should not deem such barred ma-
jority employees to have met the impairment requirement. 
Those who fall within the first section 108 category do not meet the 
impaired ability requirement because they have, by definition, had and 
declined the requisite opportunity to protect their interests. Majority 
employees are not barred by the first category of section 108 unless they 
have been given notice and an opportunity to object. 190 A number of 
courts have recognized that denying joinder does not impair an absen-
tee's interest if the absentee failed to take advantage of an opportunity to 
intervene. 191 Because anyone who qualifies as a necessary party under 
the Rule 19(a) criteria also would qualify as an intervenor of right under 
Rule 24,192 we may assume that any Category l absentee has forgone an 
opportunity to petition for intervention by the time the court applies 
Rule 19. 193 Thus, the absentees' ability to protect their interests is not 
impaired. 
With regard to the Category 2 bar, there is similar reason to find 
able. Laycock, supra note 21, at 147-48 n.39; Strickler, supra note 38, at 1596-98; Recktenwald, 
supra note II, at 175-76. 
187. R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Auth., 92 F.R.D. 17, 21 (D. Mont. 1981). 
188. JTG of Nashville v. Rhythm Band, 693 F. Supp. 623, 627 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); 3A MOORE 
& KENNEDY, supra note 89, 1!19.07[2.-1], at 19-103; see also NLRB v. Doug Neal Management Co., 
620 F.2d 1133, 1139 (6th Cir. 1980). 
189. Munoz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 633 F. Supp. 564, 566 (D. Colo. 1986); see also 
Shelton v. Exxon Corp., 843 F.2d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 1988). 
190. As discussed earlier, the terms of sec. 108 describe an "opportunity to object," rather than 
"an opportunity to intervene," see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text, but this article argues 
that intervention is the only proper mechanism for them to be heard. 
191. If courts treat the opportunity to petition for intervention as equivalent to an opportunity 
to present objections, the result might be different. 
192. See FED. R. Clv. P. 24 advisory committee's note to 1966 amends. 
193. There may be some exceptions to this proposition when a majority employee has learned so 
recently that his interests are impaired that he has not yet had an opportunity to intervene. 
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that the majority employees' ability to protect their interests is not im-
paired for purposes of Rule 19. Category 2 bars only absentees whose 
interests have been represented adequately by another party who chal-
lenged the decree. 194 Rather than being impaired, then, the ability of this 
category of barred employees to protect their interests has, by definition, 
become a moot issue because their interests already are protected ade-
quately. Accordingly, Category 2 absentees also should not be necessary 
under Rule 19(a). 
By contrast, the third category of majority employees, who would 
have been barred under the 1990 version of the Act, but are not barred 
under the 1991 Act, would have met the Rule 19(a) impairment require-
ment. This category includes absentees as to whom constitutionally ade-
quate efforts at notice had been made but who had not received actual 
notice and an opportunity to be heard. 195 With regard to these people, 
joinder under Rule 19(a) would have been appropriate if possible, but it 
probably would not have been possible. 
Those who would have been barred under Category 3 of the 1990 
Act would never have received notice, though efforts at notice had been 
made. This category would have included people whom the parties to 
the suit were unable to find. Presumably, the bound absentees would 
have included those who had not applied yet for positions or begun 
working as employees of the defendant. Because these people could not 
have been identified, they could not have been joined under Rule 19(a). 
For absentees such as these, who were necessary but could not be joined, 
the 1990 version of the rule would have required determination of 
whether they were so important as to be indispensable, requiring dismis-
sal of the suit in their absence under Rule 19(b ). This issue is discussed 
below in subpart d. 
(ii) Rule 19(a)(2)(ii) 
The other relevant portion of Rule 19(a)(2) also would counsel 
against joinder of the majority employees who may be affected by section 
108 of the 1991 Act. This subsection concerns prejudice to the defend-
ant, rather than to the absentee. Rule 19(a)(2)(ii) requires that the absen-
tees be joined if they "claim[] an interest relating to the subject matter of 
the action and [are] so situated that the disposition of the action in [their] 
absence may ... leave [the employer] subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by rea-
son of the absentees' claimed interest."196 In situations where collateral 
194. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
195. See supra note 55. 
196. The prospect of "multiple" suits against the employer not accompanied by a probability of 
success does not bring Rule 19(a) into play. The same trial judge who considers the Rule 19 motion 
will usually conduct the fairness hearing. If the judge expects the fairness hearing to permit the 
judge to ascertain whether government legal standards are violated, see infra note 219, the judge 
logically would expect any subsequent suit challenging the decree as unlawful to fail. The prospect 
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attack is available, the employer is at risk for inconsistent judgments. 
The absentees could bring a suit to challenge the decree, and that second 
suit could result in a conflicting judgment to the effect that the decree in 
the first suit was unlawful. Rule 19, however, does not require joinder to 
avoid inconsistent obligations when joinder would not eliminate the 
problem anyway. Because the majority employees, if they were joined, 
could not, under Firefighters, be forced to concur in any consent decree, 
their joinder technically would not eliminate the possibility of inconsis-
tent results, and thus would not be required by Rule 19}97 Majority 
employees who are barred by section 108, however, generally would be 
bound by any judgment or order resolving a claim of employment dis-
crimination, regardless of their objections to it, and consequently could 
not subsequently subject the employer to inconsistent obligations. This 
prong of Rule 19, then, would not render the majority employees 
necessary. 
d. Rule 19(b) 
If the court nevertheless determines that the majority employees are 
necessary under Rule 19(a), then the court must order the plaintiff to join 
of majority employees who can present substantial new facts or new arguments in the second suit 
does not undermine this premise. Even if the majority employees are able to bring new evidence to 
bear in the second court, the majority employees are limited to challenging the adequacy of the 
evidentiary foundation for the first trial court's approval of the decree or for the defendant's accept-
ance of the decree. See infra note 219. 
Our scenario should not fall automatically within the ambit of the "inconsistent obligation" 
prong because the term "inconsistent obligation" has a narrow definition, requiring more than sim-
ple logical inconsistency. Rather, the results of the two cases must be practically inconsistent or 
mutually exclusive. In short, the employer literally must be incapable of complying with both at the 
same time. In the employment discrimination context, it is probable that any inconsistent judgment 
in the second case is merely logically inconsistent, but not practically inconsistent, with the consent 
decree. Assume that the second court finds that the affirmative action plan embodied in the consent 
decree does not comply with Weber. Its holding is thus logically inconsistent with the consent de-
cree that, ideally, the entering court deemed consistent with Weber. If the court does find a violation 
of Weber, it nevertheless may grant appropriate relief not inconsistent with the decree. The em-
ployer may be doubly liable. Cf. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, lnt'l Union of the United 
Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 767 (1983). For example, it now may have to promote all the whites 
who would have received promotions absent the affirmative action plan. This does not mean that the 
employer must demote the minority employees who benefited from the plan, but rather that the 
employer must promote more people than it had intended to promote. 
Absentee majority employees were much more likely to meet the requirements of Rule 
19(a)(2)(ii) under Martin v. Wilks than under the 1991 Act. The provisions of sec. 108 should 
prohibit most absentee challenges to a judgment or order resolving an employment discrimination 
claim. Because the barred absentees never could challenge the resolution of the claim in subsequent 
litigation, there is virtually no risk that persons already parties could incur double, multiple, or 
inconsistent obligations. As a result, sec. 108 will eliminate almost completely this prong of Rule 
19(a) from the equation in employment discrimination actions. 
197. Dyke v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 557 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 734 F.2d 797 
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984); see also Rochester Methodist Hosp. v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1984); 3A MooRE & KENNEDY, supra note 89, ~ 19.07, 
at 19-123. Nevertheless, because, by the terms of sec. 108, majority employees joined under Rule 19 
would be before the judge who entered the decree, the chance of consistency between the results of 
the consent decree negotiations and the subsequent adjudication of the majority employees' claim is 
enhanced. 
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them. 198 In some instances, however, the nonparties' joinder cannot be 
accomplished. The reason for this may be that the court lacks personal 
jurisdiction over the nonparties, that their joinder would destroy diver-
sity jurisdiction, or that, once joined, the nonparties raise a valid objec-
tion to venue. 199 The reason also may be, as suggested above, that the 
absentees in question cannot be found or even identified. When joinder is 
thus impossible, Rule 19 directs the court to decide whether to proceed 
without the absentees by exercising its discretion guided by the criteria 
set forth in part (b) of Rule 19. 
Rule 19(b) sets forth four criteria pertaining to the future of the suit 
and requires the court to consider whether these and other "interests" 
dictate that the case should go forward in the necessary party's ab-
sence. 200 In the alternative, the rule permits the court to decide that, "in 
equity and good conscience," the case should be dismissed so that it can 
be brought where all necessary parties can be joined properly.201 Thus, 
"Rule 19(b) is to be applied pragmatically, with a focus on a realistic 
analysis of the facts of each case."202 Under Rule 19, the interests to be 
weighed are as follows: 
( 1) the extent of prejudice to the absentee or parties that will occur 
as a result of th~ court's rendering a judgment without the absentee; 
(2) the extent to which protective provisions in the judgment can 
lessen such prejudice; 
(3) whether the court will be able truly to resolve the matter with-
out the absentee; and 
(4) whether the plaintiff will have a forum if the action is dismissed 
for nonjoinder. 203 
The first of the four criteria, prejudice, ~ncorporates a reconsidera-
tion of the Rule 19(a) criteria: prejudice to the absentee or to the defend-
ant from inconsistent judgments.204 Upon Rule 19(b) analysis, the 
district court again weighs these Rule 19(a) factors with greater discre-
198. Joinder in this circumstance is mandatory, not discretionary. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19(a); 
Macklin v. Butler, 553 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1917); Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights 
Exception to Party Joinder, 65 N.C. L. REv. 745, 771 (1987). 
199. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 164, § 1607, at 84. 
200. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). 
The plaintiff has the right to "control" his own litigation and to choose his own forum. This 
"right" is, however, like all other rights, "defined" by the rights of others. Thus, the defendant 
has the right to be safe from needless multiple litigation and from incurring avoidable inconsis-
tent obligations. Likewise the interests of the outsider who cannot be joined must be consid-
ered. Finally there is the public interest and the interest the court has in seeing that insofar as 
possible the litigation will be both effective and expeditious. 
Lamar Haddox Contractor, Inc. v. Potashnick, 552 F. Supp. 11, 14 (M.D. La. 1982) (quoting Schut-
ten v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F.2d 869, 873 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
201. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19(b). 
202. Schmidt v. E.N. Maisel & Assocs., lOS F.R.D. 157, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (citing Provident 
Tradesmens Bank & Trust v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968)). 
203. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). 
204. As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Provident stated that prejudice to the plaintiff is 
not an issue. If it were, the plaintiff would have joined the absentee herself. Provident Tradesmens 
Bank & Trust v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, Ill (1968). 
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tion, and may throw additional considerations into the balance. For the 
same reasons that the collateral attack bar rendered the majority employ-
ees unable to protect their interests under Rule 19(a), they here may be 
deemed prejudiced for purposes of Rule 19(b). Likewise, for the same 
reason that safeguards in the second category of section 108 provided 
protection against such impairment for purposes of Rule 19(a), they do 
so for purposes of Rule 19(b) as well. Under the vetoed 1990 legislation, 
by contrast, the Category 3 absentees would have met the Rule 19(b) 
prejudice criterion. Absentees who received no notice and whose inter-
ests were not represented would have been indispensable; and the inabil-
ity to join them would have required dismissal of the case. 
The second Rule 19(b) criterion, by contrast, favors proceeding in 
the absence of majority employees. This criterion effectively provides 
that any prejudice found under Rule 19(b) may be discounted to the ex-
tent that it can be lessened by protective provisions in the judgment. 
Rule 19(b), then, goes much further than Rule 24(a) in the leeway it 
gives the court to decide for itself whether its own decision will be ade-
quate to protect the interests of the absentee. This is a key consideration 
for our purposes. As discussed below, the judge presiding over the con-
sent decree process has an opportunity to consider precisely the question 
of how to tailor the decree so that it does not prejudice absentees. 205 This 
judge has the latitude to approve only those portions of the parties' 
agreement that comport with governing legal standards.206 If a consent 
decree is legal, then the employer would win in any subsequent suit, if 
subsequent suits to challenge the decree were permitted. Proceeding 
with the suit in his absence thus would not prejudice the absentee who 
will not be allowed a collateral challenge because the foreclosed chal-
lenge would not meet with success if it were available. 207 The process 
proposed below to be followed at the fairness nearing, therefore, is im-
205. Adequate protection of [minority] rights under Title VII may necessitate . . . some ad-
justment of the rights of [majority] employees. The Court must be free to deal equitably with 
conflicting interests of (majority] employees in order to shape remedies that will most effectively 
protect and redress the rights of [minority] victims of discrimination. 
Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236, 1238-39 (5th Cir. 1971) (entering remedial order, rather 
than consent decree). 
206. Courts need not fear challenges to legal affirmative action: 
[T]he courts cannot be deterred by fears of potential adverse impact upon beneficiaries of a 
discriminatory status quo. There can be no vested interest in an unlawful practice. 
Since the [majority] cannot legitimately assert a protectable interest, they need not be 
joined pursuant to Rule 19(a) .... If the challenged . .. program is found to violate the laws 
prohibiting . . . discrimination and defendants are ordered to alter its operation, the affected 
[majority] could not succeed in a claim asserted against good faith compliance with such a 
decree. Accordingly, the (majority] need not be joined. 
Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am., 416 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). More-
over, because any subsequent challenge would, under the terms of sec. 108, be brought in the decree-
entering court, the judge in that court is in a particularly good position to assure that no prejudice 
accrues. Cf. Western Md. Ry. Co. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
207. Admittedly, there may be a gap between what is legal and what the absentee could achieve 
if he were joined in the suit. Perhaps the absentee could convince the court to approve a less drastic 
plan. 
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portant not only to protect majority employees and consequently the fi-
nality of the decree, but also to protect the original suit from dismissal if 
necessary absentees cannot be joined. Absent such protection, the origi-
nal suit and the resultant consent decree, which the bar is designed to 
protect, are threatened by the bar itself. 
The third Rule 19(b) criterion is the "adequacy of a judgment ren-
dered without the absentee.''208 This refers to the public's interest in 
having the whole dispute resolved at once, rather than to the plaintiff's 
interest in receiving complete relief. 209 When collateral attack is avail-
able, this factor points to joinder to protect the courts against additional 
lawsuits. If the section 108 bar criteria are met, so that subsequent suits 
are barred, the objective of having the whole dispute resolved at once is 
automatically met without joinder of the majority employees because the 
bar renders the first suit the only suit.210 The first suit will, by definition 
under section 108, resolve the whole dispute at once.211 Given a collat-
eral attack bar, application of this part of Rule 19(b) invariably should 
favor proceeding without the majority employee absentees. 
The fourth Rule 19(b) criterion is "inadequacy of alternative 
fora."212 In applying this criterion, the judge considers whether this is 
the only forum available to the plaintiff so that dismissal of the suit for 
want of the missing party effectively will deprive the plaintiff of any fo-
rum at all. This would be the case where, for example, jurisdiction over 
the named defendants could not be obtained in any court other than the 
forum court. It also would be the case where the necessary parties could 
not be joined because they could not be identified or located. A ruling 
that these unidentifiable absentees were indispensable, requiring dismis-
sal of the suit, would mean that the plaintiff would have no forum, be-
cause the absentees would not suddenly become identifiable when the 
plaintiff sought to file the suit in a different forum. With respect to any 
majority employees found necessary under Rule 19(a), this aspect of 
Rule 19(b) counsels against dismissal. This criterion of Rule 19, more-
over, comes into play only to save a case when other Rule 19(b) factors 
have pointed to dismissaJ.2 13 It never can weigh in favor of dismissal. 
208. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19(b). 
209. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111 (1968). 
210. This will occur when other majority employees in the suit adequately represent the inter-
ests of the absentees or else the absentees have, without being joined, already had a "reasonable 
opportunity to present objections." · 
211. One might argue that the majority's piece of the suit is being left out, so that there is not a 
complete resolution of the case. But, the majority interest is considered as a question of prejudice 
under the first Rule 19(b) criterion. This third criterion has to do with efficiency, not fairness. 
212. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). 
213. Pasco lnt'l (London) Ltd. v. Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1980). The 
court in Pasco notes that "the availability of an alternative forum is primarily of negative signifi-
cance" (absence weighs heavily, if not conclusively, against dismissal, while presence does not weigh 
so heavily). /d. at 501 n.9. Some cases show that unavailability of an alternative forum will cause a 
court not to join an otherwise indispensable party. If there is no alternative, the party is not indis-
pensable and the inquiry ends-if there is an alternative, this fact is not determinative and the in-
quiry continues. "(T]he availability of an alternative forum, standing alone, [is not) a sufficient 
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Only if other factors point to dismissal must the court consider whether 
dismissal would have the effect of putting the plaintiff out of court en-
tirely. If the court has found that it can tailor a consent decree to avoid 
prejudice to the absentee, then application of this last criterion serves 
only to reinforce that decision. 
Rule 19 analysis thus should yield a decision not to join absent ma-
jority employees under 19(a) and not to dismiss a suit for the inability to 
join them under 19(b). Section 108 provides protections that render the 
absentees unprejudiced by the case's proceeding in their absence. If the 
majority employees are deemed necessary, the fact that the identity of the 
absentees is unknown makes them unjoinable. Rule 19(b) analysis then 
must be undertaken, and the outcome should tum primarily on analysis 
under the first two Rule 19(b) criteria. If majority employee collateral 
challenges are barred, the court's ability to design a decree that curtails 
any prejudice to the absentee should resolve the Rule 19(b) inquiry. The 
outcome of this prejudice curtailment analysis in tum hinges largely on 
what can be expected to happen in the fairness hearing. Because the 
fairness hearing provides an ideal opportunity for implementing protec-
tions, indispensability findings can be averted by routine proper structur-
ing of that hearing. The next section discusses mechanisms to achieve 
that end. 
B. Approval of the Decree 
1. Wilks; Two Bites at the Apple 
Pursuant to Rule 24 or, perhaps Rule 19, our hypothetical majority 
employees now have been joined as parties in the original minority suit 
against the employer. There is some room for doubt about what, exactly, 
they should do once joined. Part of the answer to this question tradition-
ally has turned on the timing of the majority employees' joinder.214 If 
they came into the suit prior to entry of the decree, they might be permit-
ted to present their objections to the proposed decree at a "fairness hear-
ing." Traditionally, the fairness hearing provides merely an informal 
opportunity for nonparties to the decree to be heard on the question of 
whether the decree treats them fairly. 215 If permitted to intervene after 
the entry of the decree, they might mount a challenge comparable to 
what could be brought in a collateral lawsuit, with the court fully adjudi-
reason for deciding that the action should not proceed among the parties before the court." /d. at 
501 (citing Bio-Analytical Servs., Inc. v. Edgewater Hosp., Inc., 565 F.2d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978) (citing Bonnet v. Trustees ofSch. of Township 41 N., 563 F.2d 831, 
833 (7th Cir. 1977))). 
214. "Joinder" refers to both Rule 19 joinder and Rule 24 intervention. 
215. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 775 (1989); Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 
(1986). Some judges delve into the question of whether the decree comports with substantive law. 
See, e.g., Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 511-12. Although judges need not adjudicate the claims in order 
to enter a consent decree, they usually do more than merely rubber stamp the decree. Kramer, supra 
note 1, at 333, n.53 (citing Judith Resnick, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 93-96). 
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eating the question of whether the decree complies with the law.216 
Under the regime of Wilks, majority employees enjoyed two bites at 
the apple. Such employees first could attempt informally at the fairness 
hearing to avoid entry of the consent decree. If they were unsuccessful at 
that hearing, no binding effect on them resulted. They then could litigate 
formally, in the first suit or in an independent suit, the question of 
whether the consent decree entered over their objections violated the 
law.217 This two-bite-at-the-apple scheme resulted from the quasi-adju-
dicative, nonbinding nature of the fairness hearing.218 If the fairness 
hearing had been a full adjudication to which the majority employees 
were party, they would have been bound to its outcome by res judicata. 
Because of the informal nature of the fairness hearing, however, majority 
employees were not bound and were free to challenge the decree a second 
time. · 
Section 108 precludes the majority employees' second bite at the ap-
ple only to the extent that the second bite takes place in an independent 
lawsuit. If the majority employees' challenge occurs as a continuation of 
the original minority suit, then the majority employees retain their two 
bites.219 This is because the court may hold a traditional informal fair-
ness hearing before entering the decree and still fully adjudicate the ma-
jority employees' claim after entry of the decree. Although the current 
structure of consent decree cases may permit these two opportunities, 
considerations of efficiency and fairness to other interested parties sug-
gest that courts should afford only one hearing. A single fairness hearing 
can serve as the vehicle not only for airing general fairness arguments but 
216. This article refers to the court's treatment of challanges raised prior to entry of the decree 
as "preview" ofthe decree and to the court's treatment of challenges raised after entry as "review" of 
the decree. 
217. Under Firefighters, once the original plaintiff and defendant have resolved their dispute, an 
intervenor who does not join in the consent decree remains in the case. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 529. 
The intervenor can press its challenge, possibly following amendment of its complaint, and receive a 
full adjudication on the intervenor's claims. As discussed above, the Firefighters Court questioned 
whether it might have been too late by the time that case reached the Supreme Court for the inter-
venors to receive full adjudication on the merits. /d. at 530. Once the dispute between the original 
parties has been resolved, however, there is a potential argument that the intervenor's claim does not 
meet the Article Ill case or controversy requirement. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 63-65 
(1986); Strickler, supra note 38, at 1588 n.l36. But see Cooper, supra note 73, at 172. See generally 
Tobias, supra note 97. Once the consent decree is entered, and the minority plaintiffs drop from the 
case, a case or controversy arises precisely because of the consent decree's terms that create a case 
between the intervenors and the employer. 
218. For those majority employees who intervened in the original suit, some courts have as-
sumed that, in addition to raising claims that the settlement violated the majority employees' rights, 
the intervenors also could force an adjudication of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. See 
Kramer, supra note l, at 353 n.l35. As discussed below, there may be a significant difference be-
tween what the majority employees litigate as their claim and what the plaintiff would litigate in his 
claim. See supra note 213 and accompanying text; infra notes 248-50 and accompanying text. 
219. The only restriction that sec. 108 imposes is that the challenge must come in the decree 
suit, rather than collaterally, and the normal Rule 24 intervention requirements must be met. The 
Firefighters ruling, then, that the intervenors or other parties are free to protest consent decrees, 
continues to mean that majority intervenors in the first suit are free to mount challenges in that suit 
to any decree, even after the decree is entered. 
92 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW (Vol. 1992 
also for fully adjudicating the legality of the proposed decree. Such adju-
dication would resolve the majority's claims and would create a res judi-
cata effect once and for all. 
This proposal inspires the question: what is gained by settlement of 
the case if prior to entry of the consent decree the whole matter must be 
adjudicated anyway? The answer depends on one's definition of "the 
whole matter" and changes depending on whether one means the plain-
tiff's case or the majority employees' case. The plaintiff's case consists of 
proof that the defendant has discriminated and the plaintiff thereby has 
been injured. As explained below, the majority employees' case consists, 
at most, of proof that the plaintiff does not have adequate evidence to 
make a prima facie case or else that any proposed affirmative action un-
necessarily trammels the rights of the majority. 220 
This article does not advocate that the fairness hearing should entail 
full adjudication of the merits of plaintiffs' claims. That would defeat the 
entire concept of consent decrees, which are by definition based upon 
consent instead of adjudication. 221 Rather, it advocates that courts 
should employ in preview of the decree the same principles the Supreme 
Court has already developed for post hoc challenges to consent decrees. 
This would provide essentially the protections that were heretofore pro-
vided by collateral attack and would assure a single court proceeding for 
consideration of the consent decree. 222 
The envisioned fairness hearing thus only faintly resembles the fair-
ness hearing of the past. The hearing contemplated would provide joined 
majority employees a full and fair opportunity to be heard on their 
claims and would result in the same res judicata effect that would bind a 
postdecree intervenor or collateral attacker of the decree who litigated 
the decree's lawfulness. 223 How such a hearing might operate is dis-
220. Compare Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 632 (1987) (imbalance in treat-
ment need not be sufficient to support prima facie case) with id. at 653 (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
(prima facie evidence suggests need for remedial action). 
221. A hybrid scheme in which the court would adjudicate the prior discrimination predicate 
and the parties would consent to the affirmative action plan as a remedy is a possibility. This would 
not work, however, when the most burdensome part of employment discrimination litigation is the 
ascertainment of the employer's past behavior. But see Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 
371-72 (1977). By contrast, assessing possible alternative remedies and their impact on third parties 
is a simpler matter for adjudication. /d. 
222. This single hearing would be a solution to both the problem of how to protect majority 
employees who are not permitted to attack decrees collaterally under sec. 108 and to the current 
interminability of litigation that would be spawned by the availability of collateral attack to those 
not barred by sec. 108. See In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 
1492, 1494-95 (lith Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Ibarra v. Texas 
Employment Comm'n, 823 F.2d 873, 878-79 (5th Cir. 1987); Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of 
Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 
F.2d 15, 23 (lst Cir. 1980). 
223. To say that the majority employees could press their claims at this predecree stage presup-
poses that the court would deem them to have claims at that juncture. As stated above, some courts 
presently would not permit the majority employees to press a claim that the decree was unlawful 
until such time as these employees were actually denied promotions or otherwise injured by the 
decree. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. A court that will not permit such predecree 
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cussed in subpart 2 below. The question of how to protect the unidenti-
fied, unrepresented majority who are not barred by section 108 in order 
to avert subsequent challenges to the decree is discussed in subpart 3 
below. 
2. Expand the Fairness Hearing-One Bite Retained 
Traditionally, fairness hearings preceding the entry of a consent de-
cree are advisory, rather than adjudicative. The court may, but need not, 
consider some or all of the substantive factors that the court would re-
view if the consent decree were challenged subsequently by majority em-
ployees ultimately injured by the affirmative action adopted in the 
decree. 224 If the fairness hearing convinces the court that the decree does 
not comport with applicable law or notions of fairness, then the court 
either modifies or does not enter the decree. 225 If majority employees do 
not succeed in persuading the court not to enter the decree, they are 
powerless, under Firefighters, to forestall entry of the decree. Under sec-
tion 108, they should be permitted to litigate subsequently the decree's 
legality. 
a. Firefighters Guidance on Consent Decree Review and Preview 
In addition to having established that the majority employees can-
not block the decree, Firefighters also is noteworthy for having identified 
what substantive standards should govern a court's post hoc review of a 
consent decree that is challenged collaterally. These are precisely the 
same standards that govern voluntary employer affirmative action plans 
in which the court has played no role at all: the United Steelworkers v. 
Weber standards. 226 The Weber standards focus on whether the affected 
job categories in which advantages are being given to minorities tradi-
claims to be asserted will, of course, be unable to meet the goal of predecree adjudication of the 
majority's claim. 
224. See Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 508 (1986) (at two-day hearing Court consid-
ered intervenors' objections to use of minority promotional goals, to nine-year life of decree, and to 
exclusion of union from negotiations). 
225. See generally id. 
226. Jd. at 517-18 (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)). As will be dis-
cussed below, Weber has evolved into the standard for reviewing voluntary affirmative action plans 
adopted by private employers, and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), 
subsequently established the standards for review of such plans adopted by public (government) 
employers. For simplicity's sake, the standards are referred to together as the Weber standards, 
although as this article elucidates later there are differences between the two standards. See infra 
notes 226-47 and accompanying text. 
Applying Weber to consent decree affirmative action is entirely consistent with the Weber case 
itself, which involved a "voluntary" plan only inasmuch as it involved a plan not ordered expressly 
by a court. The defendant in Weber adopted an affirmative action plan only when confronted with 
legal pressure from the Department of Labor and possible Title VII liability to blacks. See PAUL 
COX, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 13-2 (1987) (citing Weber V. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. 
Corp., 563 F.2d. 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. United Steelwork-
ers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), and Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 415 F. Supp 
761, 765 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 n.9 (1979)). 
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tionally have been racially imbalanced and segregated and whether the 
affirmative action plan is, in effect, narrowly tailored. 227 
In establishing that Weber provides the guiding principles for review 
of consent decree affirmative action plans, Firefighters also illuminates 
the framework for application of those principles. Firefighters does not 
contemplate that the court will apply the Weber standards at the time it 
enters the consent decree. The parties advocating entry of the decree 
need not at that time affirmatively demonstrate the decree's compliance 
with Weber in order to acquire the court's approval. Only when the de-
cree is challenged must the court apply Weber, and when that occurs it is 
the challenger of the decree who bears the burden of showing the decree 
to be unlawful under Weber. 228 
In her concurrence in Firefighters, however, Justice O'Connor ar-
gued that the Weber analysis should play some role when the decree is 
entered, and not just when it is attacked subsequently.229 In her view, 
when a court is deciding at a fairness hearing whether to enter a consent 
decree, the proper standards under which to challenge it are those of 
Weber.230 Justice O'Connor explained that any pre-entry majority chal-
lengers should seek to prove noncompliance with Weber and that, even if 
no majority employees challenged the decree, "a court should not ap-
prove a consent decree that on its face provides for racially preferential 
treatment that would clearly violate" Weber and other governing 
precedent. 231 
Thus, Firefighters has several significant implications for the review 
and preview of employment discrimination consent decrees. It makes 
clear that a trial court does not need to adjudicate fully the question of 
whether a consent decree comports with Weber before the trial court 
enters the decree. It further confirms that Weber is, indeed, the standard 
that governs review of consent decree affirmative action plans, and, in 
Justice O'Connor's concurrence, suggests that Weber applies before entry 
of the decree as well. The next two subparts of this article discuss what a 
court should do-short of full adjudication of the plaintiff's case against 
the defendant-when it is deciding whether to enter a decree, and what, 
exactly, Weber and related cases require of affirmative action resolutions. 
b. Post Hoc Review Standards 
As O'Connor's concurrence in Firefighters explains, and as some 
227. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09. 
228. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987) (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 
272-78) (burden of proof on party who challenges affirmative action plan); Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 
522-23 (affirmative action plan's compliance with Weber to be assessed when the plan is challenged); 
id. at 531 (O'Connor, J., concu.ring) (agreeing with the Court that decision on whether plan violates 
Weber may be reserved until such time as plan is challenged). 
229. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 531 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
230. /d. 
231. /d. 
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courts already have agreed, 232 the concepts that traditionally govern post 
hoc review of affirmative action plans may and should be implemented at 
the fairness hearing to achieve more efficiently the same just ends. 233 
What standards govern the review-and here the preview-of affirmative 
action plans turns to some extent on who adopted the plan: a govern-
ment employer or a private employer. Both the Equal Protection Clause 
and Title VII govern government employers; private employers are gov-
erned only by Title VII (and any applicable state law). 
The standards for judging private employers' voluntary affirmative 
action plans were first set forth by the United States Supreme Court in 
1979 in United Steelworkers v. Weber 234 referred to above. In Weber, a 
white employee challenged an affirmative action plan for basing employ-
ment preferences on race.235 The Supreme Court established that affirm-
ative action plans, although facially contravening the Title VII 
prohibition against basing employment decisions on race, do not neces-
sarily violate Title VII. 236 The Weber Court held that voluntary affirma-
tive action is permissible when undertaken to "eliminate conspicuous 
racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories. " 237 Accord-
ing to Weber, the plan must be tailored to this remedial purpose and 
must not needlessly "trammel" the rights of majority employees. 238 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the 
Court's decision permits affirmative action under Title VII, even when 
the employer itself has not even arguably violated Title VII.239 Rather, 
232. Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1983); 
United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane). 
233. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 531 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
234. 443 u.s. 193 (1979). 
235. The preferences at issue in Weber were places in a newly established craft training pro-
gram. /d. at 197. 
236. The Supreme Court stated that 
[i]t would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial 
injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had "been excluded from the American 
dream for so long," ... constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-
conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. 
/d. at 204 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6552 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). 
237. /d. at 209. 
238. /d. at 208. The Weber Court catalogued the circumstances that rendered lawful the affirm-
ative action plan in that case: 
(1) that the plan's purposes mirrored the goals of Title VII, i.e., they sought to alleviate or 
eliminate discrimination; 
(2) that the plan was designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation; 
(3) that the plan c!id not unnecessarily trammel the interests of whites by 
(a) forcing their discharge, or 
(b) completely barring their employment or participation in the program there at issue; 
(4) that the plan was temporary, a one-time correction of imbalance, rather than a plan to 
maintain racial balance (the plan was designed to end when a proper percentage of blacks in 
the employer's work force was reached). 
See id. 
239. /d. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 
616, 630 (1986). A number of Justices have disagreed with the view that the employer adopting the 
plan need not have discriminated. See id. at 652-53 (O'Connor, J ., concurring); id. at 657 (White, J., 
dissenting); id. at 664-68 (Scalia, J ., dissenting). 
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he wrote, the Weber Court would deem a job category "traditionally seg-
regated" if there had been a "societal history of purposeful exclusion of 
blacks from the job category, resulting in a persistent disparity between 
the proportion of blacks in the labor force and the proportion of blacks 
among those who hold jobs within the category."240 Thus, under Weber, 
societal discrimination, rather than discrimination by the employer, suf-
fices for purposes of the requirement that the affirmative action plan be 
designed to remedy racial imbalance resulting from segregation. 241 
The standard for voluntary affirmative action by government em-
ployers is different. Cases subsequent to Weber have demonstrated that 
voluntary plans adopted by government employers must be designed to 
correct racial imbalance resulting from past segregation just as private 
employers' plans must. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 242 
however, the Supreme Court held that a public employer's voluntary af-
firmative action plan must be predicated on a manifest imbalance in the 
employer's work force resulting from that particular employer's own past 
discrimination, rather than from discrimination perpetrated by society as 
a whole. 243 The Wygant court did not actually require the employer to 
240. Weber, 443 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun explained this view 
in order to set forth his own disagreement with it. Blackmun's own view was that the Court should 
adopt Judge Wisdom's position permitting voluntary affirmative action only by those employers and 
unions that had committed "arguable violations" of Title VII. /d. at 213-14. 
241. In Justice White's view, permitting "traditionally segregated job categories" to mean noth-
ing more than societal discrimination, rather than employer discrimination, collapses the tests, so 
that all that is truly required is "a manifest imbalance between one identifiable group and another in 
an employer's labor force." Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657 (White, J., dissenting). On the question of 
whether an employer had met the traditionally segregated criterion, Justice Scalia wrote, in Johnson, 
that the criterion had not been met because the trial court had found expressly that the employer had 
not discriminated. /d. at 659 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, by contrast, was not so 
interested in the factual question of whether prior discrimination had occurred, but rather in the 
decisionmaker's state of mind when adopting the decree. Despite the trial court's finding of no 
discrimination, she was satisfied that the criterion was met where a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion existed in the record. /d. at 652-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring). There are thus three tiers of 
what might be required of voluntary affirmative action under Title VII: 
Scalia: Proof of egregious past discrimination by the employer (would prefer doing away 
with affirmative action entirely). See id. at 670-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
O'Connor: evidence in the record to permit the decisionmaker to believe that the employer's 
discrimination resulted in statistical disparity. See id. at 650-51 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
Brennan: evidence in the record that women or minorities are underrepresented in the 
employer's work force compared with the relevant external population. See id. at 
631-32 (Brennan, J.). 
Justice O'Connor's position does not call for analysis of the decisionmaker's subjective state of mind, 
but only of the quantum of facts before the decisionmaker. 
242. 476 u.s. 267 (1986). 
243. /d. at 274. This requirement essentially was reaffirmed when the Supreme Court, in City of 
Richmond v. Croson, predicted that the city could have met the strict scrutiny test for public sector 
affirmative action if the city had been remedying the present effects of its own past discrimination. 
City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (plurality). Scholars disagree about the 
extent to which the Croson case, which struck down Richmond's minority contract set-aside pro-
gram under an equal protection strict scrutiny test, is a harbinger of the demise of affirmative action. 
See David S. Cohen, The Evidentiary Predicate for Affirmative Action after Croson: A Proposal for 
Shifting the Burden of Proof, 7 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 489 (1989). 
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prove its own past discrimination, but did require the employer to have a 
"strong basis" for believing that remedial efforts were necessary, that is, 
that its own discrimination had resulted in the imbalance. 244 
In the case of Johnson v. Transportation Agency,245 the Supreme 
Court confirmed this distinction between the standards governing equal 
protection challenges to government affirmative action and standards 
governing Title VII challenges to public and private employer affirmative 
action. 246 The Johnson Court explained that the issue in a Title VII chal-
lenge to an employer's affirmative action plan is whether the affirmative 
action plan is designed to remedy underrepresentation due to past socie-
tal discrimination; whereas, the issue in cases of government employer 
affirmative action is whether the plan is designed to remedy imbalance 
resulting from the employer's own past discrimination. 247 The Court ex-
plained the disparity between standards for judging public and private 
plans by the fact that government employers may be challenged under 
the Equal Protection Clause, whereas private employers are subject only 
to Title VII challenge. 248 
The first prong of both Weber and Wygant requires not only that 
past discrimination (societal or employer) occurred, but also that such 
discrimination has resulted in a "conspicuous racial imbalance in tradi-
tionally segregated job categories. " 249 This imbalance is established 
through statistics. To show that an imbalance exists, it is appropriate to 
compare 
the percentage of minorities or women in the employer's work force 
with the percentage in the area labor market or general population 
... in analyzing jobs that require no special expertise ... or training 
programs designed to provide expertise, . . . . Where a job requires 
special training, however, the comparison should be with those in 
244. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277. Justice O'Connor in a concurring opinion stated that the em-
ployer should not be required to make any formal findings of its own past discrimination, but should 
have a firm basis for its position that the plan's purpose was truly to remedy the employer's past 
discrimination. Id. at 286. 
245. 480 U.S. 616, 620 (1987). Wygant and Johnson are not consent decree cases, but are di-
rectly on point by virtue of the Firefighters holding that affirmative action plans embodied in consent 
decrees are to be judged according to the standards governing voluntary affirmative action adopted 
extrajudically. 
246. See Ronald W. Adelman, Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans by Public Employers: The 
Disparity in Standards Between Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, 56 FoRDHAM L. REV. 
403 ( 1987). In fact, the Johnson case did involve a government plan, but the only challenge brought 
was under Title VII, so there was no need to consider whether the plan violated the Constitution. 
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620 n.2. 
247. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632; id. at 659 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see id. at 652 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring). Apparently the societal discrimination that would suffice is the very generalized 
societal discrimination that everyone agrees has taken place in this country. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 
278 n.5. 
248. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631. Justice O'Connor concurred in the Johnson decision, but stated 
in her separate opinion that the Johnson facts had met the heightened standard set forth in Wygant. 
/d. at 653 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
249. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979); see Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-78. 
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the labor force who possess the relevant qualifications. 250 
As discussed below, the quantity of statistical disparity necessary to 
demonstrate manifest imbalance falls something short of what would be 
required to support a prima facie pattern and practice case of institu-
tional discrimination. 251 
In addition to the first Weber predicate, which requires that the af-
firmative action plan be designed to remedy imbalance resulting from 
discrimination, the plan, whether adopted by a government or private 
employer, must not "unnecessarily trammel" the rights of majority em-
ployees. 252 Thus in Weber, an affirmative action plan was permissible 
because it did not result in the replacement of majority employees with 
minority employees. 253 In fact, the Court noted, fifty percent of the indi-
viduals who could enter the apprenticeship program that was at issue in 
Weber were white.254 Similarly, in Johnson, the Court found that the 
plan did not trammel the majority's rights unnecessarily. There, the 
male plaintiff who was denied a promotion did not lose "firmly rooted 
expectation[s]" in as much as he retained his position. Gender, more-
over, was only one factor considered by the decisionmaker, rather than 
being the sole criterion applied, which is to say the defendant adopted no 
quotas. 255 To be deemed not to trammel the rights of the majority em-
ployees unnecessarily, the plan also must be designed to attain, rather 
than maintain, a balanced work force. 256 
These, then, are the substantive standards that have guided the 
courts' post hoc review of affirmative action consent decrees and that 
should be adopted for preview of such decrees. Knowledge of the sub-
stance of the standards, however, does not answer the question of how 
those standards should apply in the context of a predecree. fairness hear-
ing. The question of who should bear what evidentiary burdens remains. 
250. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632. 
251. /d. But see id. at 654 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In a Title VII "pattern and practice" 
case, the plaintiff makes a prima facie case by showing a statistical disparity between the percentage 
of defendant's work force composed of minorities and the percentage of the population composed of 
minorities. An adequate statistical disparity, combined with evidence of examples of situations 
where employees were victims of intentional discrimination, creates the plaintiff's prima facie case. 
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
252. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. 
253. /d. (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)). 
254. /d. 
255. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631-36, 637-42. 
256. /d. at 639-40. Whether because of the potential for prejudice created by sec. 108 or be-
cause of simple notions of efficiency, courts should apply these substantive doctrines to the decree at 
the time of the fairness hearing. This discussion focuses on enhancement of proceedings at the 
fairness hearing stage with the hope that resolution of matters at that stage will enhance efficiency. 
Increasing efforts to resolve disputes as early as possible does not mean that majority employees 
cannot challenge the decree after it has been entered. If an application to intervene meets the timeli-
ness ahd other criteria discussed above, it should be granted. The standards discussed herein as 
applicable to fairness hearing consideration of decrees similarly should continue to govern post hoc 
review. 
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As with substantive standards, the procedures for post hoc review should 
be transplanted to the preview stage. 
c. Applying Post Hoc Review Standards to Preview of the 
Decree 
When a consent decree is challenged after adoption, the challengers 
have two options. They may prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the decisionmaker in the first suit did not have a strong basis in 
evidence to believe that remedial action was necessary, or they may prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the decree is unnecessarily 
broad.257 To succeed in showing the lack of a strong basis in evidence to 
support remedial action, the challengers of a private or government plan 
must prove that the affirmative action program is not warranted by evi-
dence of past societal discrimination or, in the case of a government plan 
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, that the employer's pur-
pose was not, in fact, to remedy its own prior discrimination. 258 If a 
challenge relies on the inadequacy of evidence, the court reviewing the 
consent decree need consider only whether there was adequate evidence 
in the first suit indicating that the predicates for affirmative action ex-
isted, and need not decide as a factual matter whether such predicates in 
fact ever existed.259 Rather, the challenger must demonstrate to there-
viewing court that the information available to the decisionmaker did not 
constitute an adequate predicate. 
The decisionmaker for purposes of adopting the decree could be 
deemed either the parties to the decree or the court or both. If the deci-
sionmaker includes the court entering the decree, then the challenger's 
task is to point to the record that was before the district court at the time 
that court approved the decree. If the decisionmaker is deemed to be the 
employer alone, then it becomes incumbent upon the employer to get the 
evidence of such predicates into the record only if and when the decree is 
challenged. In the latter case, whether that evidence had been in the 
record of the decree-entering district court would not matter. For pur-
257. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
258. The heightened scrutiny required for equal protection challenges to affirmative action was 
recently explained in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. , a minority set-aside case, rather than an 
employment case. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). There, the Supreme 
Court held that Richmond's programs for encouraging minority subcontractor participation in con-
tracts let by the city were not defensible under an Equal Protection Clause challenge brought by 
white subcontractors. /d. at 498-506. The Court subjected the plan to strict scrutiny review and 
struck the plan · down as neither responsive to past discrimination by the City of Richmond nor 
narrowly tailored to meet the city's ends. Croson similarly requires an evidentiary predicate to sup-
port a legislature's decision to adopt affirmative action. The Court struck down the "set-aside" 
program in Croson because the City of Richmond produced no direct evidence that either the city or 
its primary contractors had discriminated against minority-owned subcontractors. /d. 
259. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 634-36 (relying on agency plan findings of underrepresentation of 
women to support conclusion that Weber requirements had been met). Thus the majority employ-
ees' challenge may be limited to the existent record, rather than requiring new evidence. But see 
Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 538 (1986) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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poses of post hoc review, then, the question of whether the deci-
sionmaker should -be deemed to be the parties or the court will decide 
whether evidence of the predicates must be in front of the decree-entering 
court or only in the employer's possession at the time the court enters an 
unchallenged decree. 
The Firefighters case suggests that the employer, rather than the 
court, should be treated as the decisionmaker. In Firefighters, the 
Supreme Court ruled that Title VII limitations on courts' powers to or-
der affirmative action do not apply to their powers to approve consent 
decrees between parties. 260 Courts thus can approve consent decrees 
containing provisions they could not themselves order. This suggests 
that the decree-entering court is not the decisionmaker and need not it-
self be persuaded that the predicates are in place. O'Connor's concur-
rence in Firefighters confirms this, for it suggests that the parties bear no 
duty to establish to the decree-entering court's satisfaction the decree's 
legality. She would limit the court's duty of scrutiny merely to refraining 
from entering an unopposed decree if the decree is facially illegal. 261 It 
thus appears that it is the employer, rather than the court, that must 
have an affirmative reason to believe the predicates are met. For cases of 
post hoc review, then, whether in a collateral suit or in a post hoc chal-
lenge by intervenors in the decree suit, the record of the decree-entering 
court need not contain evidence of the Weber predicates, as long as the 
employer can produce such evidence in response to a challenge. 
For preview of consent decrees, what should happen depends on 
who is present. Assuming that majority employees have intervened or 
otherwise have been joined in the suit, the court should permit the major-
ity employees to proffer evidence on the absence of the evidentiary predi-
cates (whether employer or societal discrimination) and on the 
unnecessary breadth of the proposed decree. 262 The burden of persua-
sion on these issues is upon the challengers. 263 Because the issue is 
whether the record contains certain evidence, however, there is essen-
tially a burden upon the employer or the plaintiff to get such evidence 
260. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 526. 
261. /d. at 531 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see id. at 538 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(adjudication required before entry of decree). 
Interestingly, in Firefighters the intervenors had raised no legal claims pertaining to the lawful-
ness of the decree. ld at 511. As a result, no occasion arose to consider the substantive legality of 
the decree. 
262. There is some support for the notion that courts are capable of insuring that a consent 
decree comports with Weber, even absent the benefit of adversarial argument. See Culbreath v. 
Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15 {lst Cir. 1980). 
263. In Wygant, the Supreme Court stated that the district court reviewing such measures 
must make a factual determination that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its 
conclusion that remedial action was necessary. The ultimate burden remains with the [major-
ity] employees to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative-action program. But 
unless such a determination is made, an appellate court reviewing a challenge by nonminority 
employees to remedial action cannot determine whether the race-based action is justified as a 
remedy for prior discrimination. 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986). 
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into the record so that the challenger will not be able to point to its 
absence. 264 Although an employer presently bears no burden to get evi-
dence of such predicates into the record at the fairness hearing, this is 
bound to change if the court is to determine the decree's lawfulness 
before its entry. When majority employees intervene in order to mount a 
predecree challenge, the employer or minority employee must be in a 
position to proffer evidence so that the majority employees may challenge 
its sufficiency. As stated above, this evidence must be enough to support 
the conclusion that remediation is indicated, but need not be enough to 
establish a prima facie case. If no majority employees become party to 
the decree suit, the threat to the interests of absentees and to the decree's 
finality ~s far greater. Perhaps the parties to such unchallenged decrees 
should acquire the burden of establishing that the Weber predicates are 
met. 265 The next subpart contains a proposal for these cases. 
3. Protecting Absentees to Preserve Decrees 
This subpart addresses the question of what evidentiary predicates a 
court should require when no majority employees show up to challenge 
the decree. If the proposals on intervention timeliness issues discussed 
earlier in this article are adopted, 266 the absentees will be free to inter-
vene when they learn of the detriment to their interests, even though that 
discovery takes place long after entry of the decree. In order to avoid 
having to dismantle the consent decree, the decree-entering court should 
safeguard the interests of these absentees at the time it enters the 
decree.267 
To do this, courts need to employ mechanisms that ensure elicita-
tion of sufficient information from the parties to the decree to demon-
·strate that the predicates are in place and that the decree is not overly 
broad. Courts can avoid subsequent challenges by employing mecha-
nisms that protect the interests of nonparties who are, by definition, not 
only absent, but also unnotified and unrepresented by anyone present in 
264. The burden, then, is not upon the employer that adopted the plan to prove that the 
Weber/Wygant predicates are in place. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 653 
(1986). It may sound strange to say that the burden of proof is on the challenger when, in fact, it is 
the defending employer that must supply the evidence. The employer must supply the evidence, not 
because it technically bears an evidentiary burden, but rather because the issue in dispute is whether 
the court (or the parties) did indeed have before it (or them) evidence of a manifest imbalance related 
to traditionally segregated job categories. Thus the employer, or sometimes the court, must have 
evidence suggesting the manifest imbalance. It is only by proving that such evidence is wanting that 
the challenger can win. See also Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 836 F.2d 1034, 1039-40 
(7th Cir. 1984). 
265. See supra note 251. The decree may, of course, receive appellate review, but appellate 
courts apply a mere abuse of discretion standard. Firefighters was itself a collateral attack, so it does 
not necessarily resolve the issue of what should happen at the fairness hearing to protect the interests 
of unrepresented majority employees, who may otherwise subject the decree to collateral attack. 
266. See supra notes 123-65 and accompanying text. 
267. Cf United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1259 (7th Cir. 1989) (intervention 13 
years after conclusion of suit too late; collateral attack available). 
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the suit. 268 Such mechanisms might be either intrinsic or extrinsic to the 
decree suit. 
Intrinsic mechanisms are those that operate within the parameters 
of the decree suit. They might be either human or structural. A human 
mechanism could be in the form of an amicus, a guardian ad litem, 269 or 
an organization such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) (when the EEOC is not a party) appointed by the court to 
argue on behalf of unnamed people potentially affected. A major ques-
tion whenever human resources are tapped is who would pay. Structural 
protection, because it involves protective procedures rather than human 
labor, might save expense. Two possible structural protective devices are 
guidelines and presumptions. Judges might follow specific guidelines 
crafted by an entity like the EEOC, an independent commission, or an 
office within the judiciary. One problem with this alternative is that the 
guidelines would be static, unable to respond to the idiosyncrasies of par-
ticular cases the way an advocate could. For this reason, the guidelines 
would have to reflect the results of careful study of a broad range of real 
cases, so that the court would be alerted to arguments that might have 
been made if an interested party had been there to make them. The other 
structural protection would involve a legal presumption. A presumption 
against approval of the consent decree could become part of the fairness 
hearing. The prime difficulty with use of a presumption against approval 
of the decree is that it would undermine a heretofore clearly expressed 
congressional preference for settlements and would thwart the rule of 
Wygant and Johnson that the burden be placed upon those challenging 
the legality of an affirmative action plan. 270 
An extrinsic protection is one that operates outside the suit itself to 
protect the interests of absentees from the suit. The judiciary could em-
ploy a centralized system for expert review of consent decrees. The 
EEOC, when not a party, might serve in this capacity or might coordi-
nate such a system. Problems with such extrinsic protection would be 
the complexity and time-consumption that referral to the outside agency 
would entail and the diminishment in trial court autonomy that would 
result. Another problem with this alternative is expense, although 
money could be saved if unbiased think tanks and academic institutions 
could be signed up to provide expertise on a pro bono basis. 
Use of these types of mechanisms, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, 
268. The argument was made earlier that courts should assume they are making decisions con-
trary to law when d~iding whether the interests of absentees in a lawful decision are threatened. See 
supra note 109 and accompanying text. That argument should not be taken to imply that courts can 
never be trusted to see that the interests of absentees are protected. The fact that, for effective 
operation of Rules 19 and 24, courts should assume their decisions are wrong does not mean that 
they cannot, with precautions, assure right decisions. 
269. See Thomas H. Odom, When Consent Decrees are Lacking Consent, LEGAL TiMES, July 
30, 1990, at 20. 
270. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987) (citing Wygant v. Jackson 
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986)). 
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would give courts a substitute for adversarial argument on the legality of 
the decree. The interests of absentee employees would, in effect, be rep-
resented artificially, with the result that post hoc challenges would be 
destined to fail and become unattractive alternatives. To assure represen-
tation of absentees' interests in the predecree stage would assure decree 
finality because the decree would have survived the type of Weber chal-
lenge the majority employees would raise upon a subsequent collateral 
challenge. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Martin v. Wilks left an open invitation for majority employees to 
mount collateral challenges to consent decrees resolving suits by minor-
ity employees against their employer. The 1991 Civil Rights Act will 
limit most challenges to the decree suit itself, thereby serving the ends of 
both Title VII and judicial economy. This statutory bar against collat-
eral attacks will adequately protect the interests of majority employees 
and the finality of consent decrees if courts take appropriate precautions 
in construing the joinder rules and in considering proposed consent 
decrees. 
Two joinder rules are relevant. The majority employees may inter-
vene in the minorities' suit against the employer. If the majority employ-
ees do not seek intervention, then a party to the suit, or the court sua 
· sponte, may seek their joinder as necessary or indispensable parties. 
Analysis of Rule 24, governing intervention, suggests that intervention 
·should be allowed freely in these cases. Analysis of Rule 19, governing 
necessary and indispensable parties, suggests that majority employees 
usually should be deemed neither necessary nor indispensable in these 
circumstances. However they become parties to the decree suit, majority 
employees are in a position to participate in negotiations and help shape 
any ensuing. consent decree, and their interests are thus adequately pro-
tected, without resort to collateral challenges. 
Regardless of whether majority employees actually join in the de-
cree suit, the court should take the opportunity of the fairness hearing to 
assure that the Weber predicates are in place. When the majority is not 
represented, courts may protect majority employee interests even in the 
absence of anyone challenging the decree. Mechanisms extrinsic and in-
trinsic to the suit can supply the guidance and perspective needed to as-
sure that the consent decree comports with Weber standards, and thus 
does not violate majority rights. By protecting majority employee inter-
ests, use of such mechanisms will insure the finality of consent decrees. 
